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The LTTE insurgency seeking a separate Tamil state in Sri Lanka was 
successfully eliminated by the Sri Lankan military in 2009. Toward the end of the 
conflict, Sri Lanka’s armed forces strength rose to approximately 375,000. The use of the 
military in nation-building projects was misunderstood by many as militarization of the 
country. Therefore, this thesis asks these questions: How are the civil authorities 
maintaining control and effectiveness of the country’s armed forces? And how does the 
civilian government constructively utilize the military and continue to assert civilian 
rule?  
These questions were examined as a comparative single case study because in 
recent history, no civilian government has concluded terrorism through military means. A 
combination of Huntington’s subjective and objective civilian control theory, Alagappa’s 
state coercion theory, and Matei and Bruneau’s CMR dimensions was used. This thesis 
finds that the civilians used heavy subjective-control mechanisms to ascertain the 
subordination of military due to political competition. However, the divided political 
setting prevented the military from entering into party politics, increasing 
professionalism and antithesis of subjective control, which is objective control. 
In this situation, Huntington’s subjective control did not happen, as the divided 
political setting and conflict positively contributed to ascertaining civilian control.    
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION  
After independence from Great Britain in 1948, Sri Lanka experienced an era of 
relative peace. In 1975, Sri Lanka faced its biggest challenge in the form of the Tamil 
insurgency, which led to a three-decade conflict. In 2009, the Sri Lankan military 
defeated the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) that had fought for a separate state. 
Toward the end of the conflict, Sri Lanka increased its armed forces by 80 percent, 
raising the numbers to approximately 375,000, which is still its strength to date.1 In a 
post-conflict setting, it is a challenge for any civilian government, especially a small 
island state, to maintain such a large military. The military comprised 1.84 percent of Sri 
Lanka’s population, which was 20.3 million as of 2012.2 Sri Lanka appears to have done 
this quite successfully, and the country has bounced back from the civil war, with a 6.3 
percent increase in economic growth and at the same time, strong democratic 
developments with the powerful civilian government.3 In this context, this investigation 
attempts to answer the following questions: how are the Sri Lankan civil authorities 
maintaining control and effectiveness of the country’s armed forces and how does the 
civilian government constructively utilize the military and at the same time assert civilian 
rule? This thesis will examine civil–military relations in Sri Lanka in the post-conflict 
period and some of the challenges it faced. 
                                                 
1 Muttukrishna Sarvananthan, “Sri Lanka: Putting Entrepreneurship at the Heart of Economic Revival 
in the North, East, and Beyond,” Contemporary South Asia 19, no. 2 (2011): 209, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/
09584935.2011.565313. However, this author quotes an interview with Sri Lanka’s secretary of defense in 
an Indian defense review magazine, in which the secretary of defense says that these figures are fluctuating. 
Accordingly, the total strength of the Sri Lankan military is approximately 200,000 for the Army; 60,000 
for the Navy; and 60,000 for the Air Force. 
2 Sri Lanka Department of Census and Statistics, “Census of Population and Housing 2012,” 
http://www.statistics.gov.lk. 
3 The World Bank notices, “Economic growth in Sri Lanka has been among the fastest in South Asia 
in recent years. Growth averaged 6.3 percent between 2002 and 2013.” World Bank, “Sri Lanka 
Overview,” accessed June 4, 2015, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/srilanka/overview. 
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B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
In 2009, under the administration of President Mahinda Rajapaksa, the Sri Lankan 
government successfully defeated the LTTE insurgency. The well-coordinated 
government–military strategy helped defeat the LTTE organization, which had a large 
network for international fund raising, arms smuggling, as well as human and drug 
trafficking associated with financing the insurgency. The LTTE was also one of the first 
organizations to carry of transnational suicide bombings. It had owned well-structured 
ground, sea, and air military branches to fight against the Sri Lankan government and 
society. During the conflict, Sri Lanka increased the military strength to its current 
numbers, and after the conflict, it used the military’s institutional capacities for nation-
building projects. Tamil political elites and scholars viewed these efforts as militarizing 
the country.4  
The country also experienced important political developments as the democratic 
state strengthened its governance. In 2010, retired General Sarath Fonseka, who had 
recently led the Sri Lankan army, campaigned against President Mahinda Rajapaksa in 
the presidential election. This was the first instance in Sri Lankan history that a former 
commander involved himself in politics after retirement. Fonseka’s political engagement 
led civilian authorities to scrutinize senior military leaders—over their affiliation with the 
former general, in fear of a military coup. Despite scrutiny, the Sri Lankan military did 
not take advantage of its strength to topple the civilian government. This illustrates a trust 
relationship between the state and the military, which, historically, did not get involved in 
politics.  
There are several reasons why Sri Lanka’s civil–military relations (CMR) are 
important to study. First, the increased military strength and growing popularity of 
military after the conflict attracts scholars who are interested in the influence of military 
participation in domestic affairs. For example, soon after the presidential election of 
2010, the Rajapaksa government faced a tense situation over the defeated candidate 
                                                 
4 Meera Srinivasan, “Military Presence in Sri Lanka’s North Is Worrisome: Wigneswaran,” The 
Hindu, June 12, 2014, accessed May 26, 2015, http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/south-asia/
military-presence-in-sri-lankas-north-is-worrisome-wigneswaran/article6108055.ece; Sarvananthan, “Sri 
Lanka: Putting Entrepreneurship,” 205–213.    
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General Fonseka. Jayadeva Uyangoda explains, “[Retired General] Fonseka refused to 
accept the poll results, creating a state of tension and uncertainty for several days 
following the election. Events took another dramatic turn when Fonseka was arrested on 
charges of military indiscipline.”5 The dilemma then was how the civilian state would 
maintain its supremacy under this condition. Sri Lanka represents an important case study 
for other countries struggling with a post-conflict, civil–military imbalance. In addition, 
identifying the roles and missions that civilian rulers have assigned to the military and 
examining how effectively the military accomplishes those roles and missions will help 
to gauge the effectiveness of Sri Lankan military.  
Second, from an economic standpoint, Sri Lanka illustrated an unusual case of a 
country maintaining economic growth and development during and after a conflict. This 
translated into continued improvement in the living conditions of the people.  
The United Nations Human Development (UNDP) index ranks Sri Lanka first in 
South Asia.6 How the state fought a three-decade long war while maintaining economic 
development would be an interesting topic to explore because, arguably, during the 
conflict, delivering public goods and services to citizens is difficult. Sri Lanka was able 
to achieve this. How has this continued in the post conflict period? Exploring Sri Lanka’s 
experience and identifying its unique style of civil–military relations (CMR) after the 
conflict will contribute to the literature of civil–military relations.  
Third, Sri Lanka is subject to Indian and western great power politics. Sri Lanka’s 
development projects, economic ties, and military cooperation with China have affected 
relations with India and the West. In relation to that, other great powers see China as 
using Sri Lanka’s strategic geographic position to project power across the Pacific region. 
In that context, the Sri Lankan government is important for balancing power in the 
region, while also strengthening the developing democratic process. The previous 
government of Mahinda Rajapaksa adopted a pro-Chinese foreign policy. Many believe 
                                                 
5 Jayadeva Uyangoda, “Sri Lanka in 2010,” Asian Survey 51, no. 1 (2011): 132, http://www.jstor.org/
stable/10.1525/as.2011.51.1.131. 
6 News First, “Sri Lanka Ranks Above All Other South Asian Nations In UN Human Development.” 
accessed December 07, 2015. http://newsfirst.lk/english/2014/07/sl-placed-73rd-position-united-nations-
human-development-index-2014/46277. 
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that China helped the Sri Lankan economy and elevated its strategic importance in the 
Indian Ocean.7 In contrast, new president, Sirisena has promised publically that he will 
adopt a non-aligned foreign policy. Military participation in United Nations peace 
keeping missions can support the military to inculcate democratic norms in the long run. 
Therefore, India and the West being in major influential position in the United Nation 
organization, those countries can assist Sri Lanka to secure more participation in United 
Nations missions.  
Moreover, twenty-first century security challenges affect developing democracies 
like Sri Lanka more seriously, due to weak, inexperienced institutions and lack of 
resources (equipment and technology); all of this can limit the capabilities of the armed 
forces. This affects the military’s effectiveness in carrying out assigned roles and 
missions.8 Therefore, identifying how Sri Lanka’s civilian government uses and prepares 
its military to undertake new challenges, such as participating for international peace 
operations, is important information for other developing democracies. 
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Sri Lanka has a long history as a democratizing country, but democracy in any 
country is not consistently guaranteed. According to Stewart Patrick, “state strength is 
relative and can be measured by the state ability and willingness to provide the 
fundamental political goods……and social welfare.”9 A state’s strengths and weaknesses 
can shape its democratic nature. When examining the Sri Lankan post-war democratic 
consolidation, it is evident that the democracy level fluctuated in varying degrees after 
the conflict. The government failed to fully execute its democratic rights of peaceful 
governance during the conflict, especially in the Northern and Eastern areas, but in the 
                                                 
7 Patrick Barta, “In Sri Lanka’s Post-Tsunami Rise, China Is Key,” Wall Street Journal, December 18, 
2014, accessed February 22, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/in-sri-lankas-post-tsunami-rise-china-is-
key-1418938382. 
8 Florina Cristiana Matei, “A New Conceptualization of Civil Military Relations,” in The Routledge 
Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei (New York: 
Routledge, 2012), 32. 
9  Patrick Stewart, “Weak State and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction,” The Washington Quarterly 29, 
no. 2 (2006): 27–53, accessed April 23, 2015, https://muse.jhu.edu.libproxy.nps.edu/journals/
washington_quarterly/v029/29.2patrick.html. 
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post-conflict phase, the state started to expand democratic development, as seen in the 
elections of 2010 and 2015.  
The democratically elected civilian rulers face a multitude of challenges while in 
power. They face the full spectrum of national security threats, international and domestic 
political pressures, and administration deficits in delivering public goods and services. Sri 
Lanka has experienced these challenges but has managed to meet its social and welfare 
obligations to its citizens efficiently during the conflict and the post-conflict period.  
Sri Lanka’s Post-conflict military is approximately 320,000, but Sarvananthan 
says in the year 2011, it was 450,000 uniformed personnel and “one armed person for 
every 50 people in the country.”10 However, there were no coup-attempts made by the 
military against President Rajapaksa, but this raises the question, “How influential is Sri 
Lanka’s military?”  
In addition, to deal with external and internal aggressions and non-sate actors, the 
civilian-decision makers rely on the institutions of military. Even though military control 
is a challenge, the military reputation of a country is an asset for the rulers to legitimize 
coercion. Therefore, providing services through the military in order to gain credibility 
and public acceptance towards military is important. In democratic countries, the civilian 
rulers decide the role of military. Therefore, it is important to understand this relationship 
particularly in a post-conflict period, such as in Sri Lanka. How is the relationship 
reasserted? 
Hypothesis #1 
The Sri Lankan government’s CMR strategy used to control the military in the 
post-conflict period is a combination of a new conceptualization framework, subjective 
and objective civilian control, and state coercion. 
                                                 
10 Sarvananthan, “Sri Lanka: Putting Entrepreneurship,” 209. 
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Hypothesis #2 
The Sri Lankan military is the largest institution that supports state coercion and 
is an important nation-building force in the post-conflict setting. The growing popularity, 
reputation, and confidence in the military will increase its power and influence in the 
political realm. However, the military will not exploit its opportunity to intervene in 
politics, because it accepts civilian supremacy and hopes to maintain professionalism. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review focuses on civilian control of the military and the roles 
assigned to the military during the post-conflict period. In the field of civil–military 
relations (CMR), many available literatures focus on established democracies and 
developed countries; however, it is important to determine whether established CMR 
concepts can be applied to Sri Lanka, which is a developing country that recently 
concluded its three-decade-long war. 
While there are several important CMR theories, scholars do not uniformly agree 
with a single model. Thomas Bruneau states that Samuel P. Huntington’s four-decade old 
CMR theory is not relevant for either developed or emerging democracies, in particular 
considering the current global setting, and he submits a new conceptual framework. 11  
Peter Feaver acknowledges that Huntington’s theory was the landmark study but 
also suggests that it is an important point of departure for new paradigms.12 However, 
Feaver notes that during the Cold War period, Huntington’s advice and predictions made 
on the United States’ CMR did not happen as he said.13 Therefore, Feaver suggests the 
principle agent theory to substitute Huntington’s theory.14  
                                                 
11 Thomas C. Bruneau, “Development of an Approach through Debate,” in The Routledge Handbook 
of Civil-Military Relations, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei (New York: Routledge, 
2012), 23. 
12 Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil–Military Relations (Harvard 
University Press, 2003), 7. 
13 Ibid., 16. 
14 Ibid., 10, 16. 
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Muthiah Alagappa’s work further identifies that CMR in Asia is different from 
CMR in Western Europe and notes some similarities with South American nations.15 
Clearly, in the field of CMR, there is no standard model to test the supremacy or the 
effectiveness of civilian control. Since there is no specific post-war CMR-related 
literature to use to examine the Sri Lankan situation, I will combine Huntington’s 
subjective and objective civilian control; Bruneau’s work on civilian control, civilian 
oversight, and roles and missions; and Alagappa’s work on identifying CMR dimensions. 
Alagappa states that subjective civilian control will continue in Sri Lanka,16 but Sri 
Lanka has strong executive governance oversight in designing roles and missions for the 
military.17 In this context, understanding which theoretical concepts are more relevant to 
examine the civilian control in Sri Lanka will provide a new theoretical insight into post-
conflict CMR.   
1. Definition and Explanation of CMR 
CMR is a discipline in the field of social science that examines the relationship 
between civilian rulers or institutions and military commanders or the military as an 
institution. Huntington points out that CMR is only “one aspect of national security 
policy.”18 Matei notes that civilian control is basic and fundamental to CMR.19 However, 
these relations are often contentious, and countries transitioning through democratic 
stages will experience civilian supremacy accordingly. The failure or inefficiency of 
political institutions to provide fundamental political goods, economic management, and 
                                                 
15 Muthiah Alagappa, Coercion and Governance: the Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 9. 
16 Alagappa, Coercion and Governance, xvi.  
17 Don Wijewardana, How LTTE Lost the Eelam War (Sri Lanka: Stamford Lake (Pvt) Ltd, 2012), 
115–117. 
18 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1957), 1. 
19 Matei, “A New Conceptualization of Civil Military Relations,” 33. 
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physical security for citizens can lead to a military coup, which is a threat for democratic 
consolidation.20  
Over the last decade, three dozen coups were reported in the world; from 1950 to 
2010, there were 94 coup attempts.21 Only seven were reported from 2008 to 2010,22 but 
despite this decline, military influence has been harder to measure and remains 
challenging for civilian rulers.23 In 2010 and 2015, Sri Lanka’s civilian leaders feared a 
military coup. The first instance was after the presidential election in 2010 when the 
defeated candidate, retired General Fonseka, was jailed accusing the violation of military 
law. Fearing a military coup, the Rajapakse government suspended the service of another 
group of senior officers on compulsory retirement grounds.24 Soon after the 2015 
presidential election, the defeated Rajapaksa government was subjected to the opposition 
parties’ criticisms for attempting a military coup.25 However, in the both instances, the 
military did not side with any individuals or any particular political party. It maintained 
neutrality.   
2. Debate 
Huntington’s book The Soldier and the State is considered the leading theoretical 
paradigm in CMR even after nearly 40 years.26 Nevertheless, his arguments on officer 
corps professionalism, subjective civilian control, and objective control have often been 
                                                 
20 Alagappa, Coercion and Governance, xvii; Babar Sattar, “Pakistan: Return to Praetorianism,” in 
Coercion and Governance: the Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, ed. Muthiah Alagappa, 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 385.     
21 Jonathan M. Powell and Clayton L. Thyne, “Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010: A New 
Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research 48, no. 2 (March 2011), 249–55.  http://www.jstor.org/stable/
29777507.   
22 Powell and Thyne, “Global Instances of Coups,” 249–55.  
23 Peter D. Feaver, “Civil–Military Relations,” Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999): 219, 
http://www.annualreviews.org.libproxy.nps.edu/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.211. 
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reexamined by other scholars. Bruneau states that “it became clear to me that 
Huntington’s formulation could possibly be useful for discussing civil–military relations 
in stable democracies, but it provides little help to those still in the process of reaching 
this state.”27 Bruneau summarizes other scholars’ findings about Huntington’s work.  
Accordingly, Bruneau points to three weaknesses.28 First, subjective and 
objective civilian control that centers on military professionalism is a tautology and 
cannot be disproved or proved. Second, there is selective data use in the 
conceptualization of the military profession. Third, professionalism cannot be measured 
because it is similar to culture. In addition, although other scholars have identified 
weaknesses in the Soldier and the State, Bruneau notes that these individuals have not 
been able to present alternatives without referring back to Huntington’s work.29   
Huntington’s main discussion focuses on subjective civilian control, objective 
civilian control, and military professionalism. In subjective civilian control, civilian 
groups with various interests compete with each other to gain superior control over the 
military. In this discussion, power maximization of one or more civilian group is relative 
to other civilian groups at the national level. Control of the military is achieved through 
governmental institutions, social classes, and constitutional forms.30At the government 
level, the President and members of the legislature compete with each other on decisions 
about the military. This allows these competing groups to politicize the military. This 
competition indicates that when no professional military officer corps is present, the 
subjective civilian control is evident in governing systems.31 
Next, Huntington notes that objective civilian control allows for autonomy and 
supports the military to maximize its own professionalism.32 The main idea is to keep the 
military away from politics while recognizing its autonomous state in deciding military 
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28 Ibid., 15–17. 
29 Ibid., 15 
30 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 81. 
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affairs; however, it remains under government civilian control.33 Huntington expected 
that this objective could be achieved naturally. He stated that once the military becomes 
more professionalized, then it can remain neutral in political alignments.34 However, 
Bruneau explains that Huntington’s work abruptly measured the complex and contending 
relationships between authority, influence, and military ideology with non-military 
groups.35    
Huntington’s subjective and objective civilian control is centralized into military 
professionalism, and he uses examples from Germany, Japan, and the United States to 
support this conceptualization. However, Bruneau points out other scholars’ 
disagreement on Huntington’s military professionalism, indicating that military 
professionalism—much like culture—cannot be measured as a stable component because 
it is subject to frequent change.36 Huntington’s CMR model focuses on achieving civilian 
supremacy through subjective and objective control, which significantly affects military 
professionalism.37 Given this circular logic, Bruneau states that Huntington’s concepts 
are impossible to prove or disprove. However, some of Huntington’s concepts, like 
subjective civilian control, are relevant for developing democracies.38 Huntington’s study 
was a landmark in the early stages of CMR, and as Feaver notes, “what has been written 
since has been an explicit or implicit response to [Huntington’s] argument.” 39 Sri Lanka 
is a developing country, yet its civilian rulers have managed to subordinate their military 
for decades. Therefore, to examine the post-conflict CMR in Sri Lanka, Huntington’s 
concepts provide analytical insight. 
Samuel E. Finer argues that Huntington’s military professionalism is not the only 
factor that keeps military away from politics. He notes that actually it is the military 
                                                 
33 Ibid., 83–88. 
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acceptance of the civilian supremacy.40 Finer introduces the term “consciousness,” which 
he argues makes the armed forces believe that they are servants of the state. The Sri 
Lankan military invest in military education, aiming to elevate military 
professionalism.41 The Sri Lankan military has proved its acceptance of civilian 
supremacy by maintaining neutrality in the 2010 and 2015 presidential elections. Finer’s 
concept in accepting the civilian supremacy can provide analytical insight to examine 
CMR in Sri Lanka.  
Peter D. Feaver states that CMR creates a paradox. Feaver explains, “The civil-
problematique is a simple paradox: because we fear others we create an institution of 
violence to protect us, but then we fear the very institution we created for protection.”42 
In turn, Feaver highlights two principles that are conflicting with each other in this 
paradox. The first principle is that the military must be strong to prevent war within 
society and must be able to protect it from outside aggressions; second, while protecting 
the political structures and society from enemies, it should be able to organize its own 
affairs and should not destroy the society that it intended to protect.43 Democratic 
societies elect political agents to govern and control state affairs; in turn, they act upon on 
behalf of the people. Next, they delegate authority to professionals for managing the 
institutions. Professional military agents manage the military institution and ruling 
civilian political agents control the military agents.44  
3. Principal Agent Theory 
In that context, to prevent a military exercising coercion on society or on the 
ruling government, Feaver introduces the principal agent theory, which explains the 
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continuing interaction between principal agents and military agents at a strategic level for 
monopolizing the use of force. In the theory, civilians establish relatively intrusive or 
nonintrusive monitoring mechanisms to control the military, and in response, the military 
agents have the option to preform or shirk their responsibilities.45 The military will 
respond on either material incentives or fear of punishment. Any number of agencies 
(legislature, judicial system, and other bureaucratic institutions) will conduct monitoring 
of the military. This theory explains how Sri Lanka’s civilian rulers’ strategy is effective 
in controlling the military through institutionalized mechanism. I will present the details 
in chapter three.  
4. New Conceptualization Framework 
Bruneau emphasizes that much of the literature is focused on well-established 
western democracies. 46 In addition, Bruneau indicates that there are new democracies 
around the globe, so new conceptualization framework is needed to address CMR issues. 
Therefore, Matei and Bruneau’s work presents a new conceptualized framework to fit 
both developing and consolidated democracies.47 Such new conceptualization is required 
because of the changing nature of warfighting. 
After the Cold War, nations have identified a need for versatile military force to 
face new challenges. Nations are less subject to interstate wars but they are facing 
challenges in the form of transnational threats, acts of international terrorist 
organizations, effects of natural disasters, requests for international peace support 
operations, and demands for humanitarian assistance. Such military force is capable in 
protecting the national security as well as supporting the international community.48 In 
relation to these new challenges, the new framework identifies that CMR should not only 
focus on civilian control but should also analyze how both civilians and military agents 
are working on interdependency and tradeoffs between control, effectiveness, and 
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efficiency.49 The effectiveness is determined by military preparedness for the civilian 
rulers’ assigned roles and missions while efficiency relies on the allocation of resources 
at the lowest cost.  
In this framework, civilian control is formed in the areas of institutional control, 
oversight, and incorporated professional norms. Institutional mechanisms support 
civilians in providing guidance for military forces through laws and regulations; these 
mechanisms support civilian leadership.50 Civilian led organizations can include the 
Ministry of Defense whose purpose is to direct military affairs. The work of Matei and 
Bruneau suggests creating a separate ministry of interior for police and national 
intelligence agencies.51 
Oversight is achieved through institutional regulations and administrative laws. 
The executive, legislative, and judicial branches have the authority to monitor the 
military. In addition, to conduct oversight, independent media, think tanks, NGOs, and 
international organizations can support the government. 
For professionalism, legally backed policies and regulatory mechanisms should be 
involved in deciding military size, training, and promotions. Subsequently, the 
effectiveness of the military depends on how accurately civilians define and design 
military roles and allocate resources to carry out assigned tasks. This conceptual 
framework discusses achieving effectiveness at a minimal cost.52 
This framework identifies the necessity of controlling not only the military but 
also other security agencies like police and intelligence units required to preserve 
democracy.53 This framework helps examine Sri Lanka’s strategy for maintaining control 
and effectiveness of the country’s armed forces.   
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5. Governance and Coercion  
Alagappa identifies colonial origin as the obvious reason for some countries’ 
civilian supremacy in political structures of Asia, which has given birth to institutions 
that were required to govern states through bureaucratic procedures. Some of those 
procedural legacies are still in effect in post-colonial countries. For example, Sri Lanka 
achieved its independence in 1948 from British rulers; therefore, in the Sri Lankan 
parliamentary system, proceedings are conducted in British fashion. CMR in the country 
also demonstrates the legacy of British rule.  
State coercion is a tool used for constructing political domination in society; it 
exercises the government control within national boundaries.54 The Sri Lankan 
government used military in Northern and Eastern regions to control the Tamil militancy. 
In relation to Alagappa’s work, if a civilian government uses the coercive power of the 
military excessively, it lacks legitimacy and has to depend on the military to be in 
power.55 As a result, either the military or other security apparatuses have the advantage, 
and the civilian rulers have to accommodate military requests and political agendas 
simultaneously. This leads to a larger military that is supported by a legal framework to 
legitimize its action.56 According to Alagappa, this situation creates an opportunity for 
the military to establish a commanding position above all other rival institutions but 
hinder the development of political, administrative, and judicial institutions in a 
government.57 To avoid the influence of the military, he suggests increasing or 
decreasing the military’s expenditures for internal security and defense. This involves the 
correct sizing of security forces, changing of command structure, and deployments; 
moreover, reforming the security mandate, declaration of emergency and martial law are 
few.  
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In addition, Alagappa considers the following to understand the CMR challenge: 
the developments of political, diplomatic, socio-economic, and cultural measures.58 
However, he also states that military has a key role to play in nation-building.59 
Therefore, any study has to apply a macro framework. Soon after the conflict, the Sri 
Lankan military undertook many nation-building projects and became heavily involved in 
other administrative institutions. Therefore, the state coercion and governance concept is 
relevant to analyze post-conflict CMR in Sri Lanka.  
Moreover, Alagappa’s study on 16 countries in Asia identifies that the “military is 
still a crucial actor in domestic and international politics, playing key roles in state and 
nation-building, in political domination, in maintaining internal order, and in ensuring 
international security.”60 This confirms that Finer’s argument on why the military 
engages in politics is not relevant, but the more important point here is to examine why 
they do not.61 Finer’s work asserts that military interventions are overt in the low 
political order countries like Haiti, but the covert influences of militaries exist in the 
developed and high political order established countries like the U.S.62  
Alagappa also identifies that when state coercion is salient, the military acts with 
the government to deliver state coercion and increase the power and influence of the 
military. On the other hand, Alagappa discusses that the success in economic 
development and developing strong institutions of non-coercion has proved the decline of 
military power and influence.63 However, some scholars have argued that civilian control 
cannot be achieved through increased social conditions or economic development and 
through increased levels of professionalism of the military or distributing one civilian 
group’s political domination on another.64 
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The degree of power and influence that the military can force on society or 
civilian rulers will depend on how civilian rulers see its importance or weight of coercion 
relative to norms, rules, laws, and customs in the practice of governance.65 He argues that 
civilian supremacy will depend on the weight of state coercion, and it varies depending 
on the challenges faced by the country. Both Alagappa and Olmeda agree on the high 
level of civilian supremacy that can be achieved during interstate war compared to 
intrastate conflicts,”66 but Olmeda argues that it is extremely difficult to gauge the 
civilian control because CMR studies are more descriptive than casual analysis. He points 
out that the reason for this is the difficulty of collecting data from interviews, government 
resources, and official documents.67  
6. Roles and Missions 
Matei suggests six broadly categorized roles for the military: “war, internal wars, 
terrorism, crime, humanitarian assistance, and peace operations.”68 Few studies on post-
conflict scenarios implicitly discuss roles and missions for military, yet Matei’s work 
identifies temporary humanitarian assistance roles for military. These indicated roles and 
missions are part of the national security strategy. When examining the Sri Lankan post-
conflict setting, these roles and missions could be validated to some extent.  
In contrast, some scholars like S. Sarvananthan have strongly criticized the Sri 
Lankan military involvement in civilian business ventures and warn that those actions 
will lead military involvement in politics that is similar to Pakistan.69 On the other hand, 
Larry Jay Diamond and Marc F. Plattner note, “Historically many of the militaries have 
undertaken non-combat roles, including disaster relief, internal security and policing, 
economic development and social welfare provisions.”70 They further indicate that 
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missions other than war will not raise options for the military to participate in politics or 
effect warfighting capability. 71 The Sri Lankan military maintain their warfighting 
ability and professionalism by keeping one reserve strike division and training their 
troops while participating in annual joint operation exercises.  
7. Literature Specific to Sri Lanka  
There is no post-conflict-specific literature for Sri Lanka’s CMR, but Jagath P. 
Senarathne notes in his work in 2002, that subjective civilian control has existed in Sri 
Lanka.72 He points out that the majority Sinhala Buddhist ethnic representation in 
civilian elites and the military is high compared to other ethnic groups, and he believes 
that this shapes the political and institutionalization process. In the article, he describes 
Sri Lanka’s executive branch, legislature, and military linking institutional framework. 
This study is not current, but it discusses many supporting CMR concepts. Don 
Wijewardana, an economist, points out President Rajapaksa’s ability to delegate tasks to 
professionals and refrain from interfering in operational activities.73 Even though the 
book does not describe the CMR concepts in the post-conflict period, it contributes to the 
literature by describing CMR in Sri Lanka during the conflict.  
The scholars discussed above disagree on a single model for controlling the 
military but admit changing dynamics of international politics, globalization, and new 
domains of warfighting, often shape CMR in nation states.        
8. Designing CMR Model 
This thesis seeks to determine how existing CMR literature explains the Sri 
Lankan government’s continuing effectiveness in controlling the military in the post-
conflict setting. Sri Lanka’s military is the largest, most organized and capable institution 
of the state. This study on Sri Lanka can provide an important theoretical case for 
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understanding the stabilization of CMR in the post-conflict phase, which few developed 
countries have experienced in the West.  
When examining the Sri Lankan government’s strategy in controlling the military 
in a post-conflict setting, Huntington’s literature on subjective and objective civilian 
control can be considered with other scholars like Muthiah Alagappa because he 
identifies that the “subjective civilian control is likely to continue in Singapore, Malaysia, 
and Sri Lanka.” 74 Reexamination of the validity of this statement is important because 
prior to the end of the Sri Lankan conflict, the military faced severe setbacks while 
fighting with LTTE, raising the question of how the same military defeated the LTTE 
under a different civilian leadership.  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
In the field of CMR, there is no standard model to test the supremacy of civilian 
control neither its effectiveness. Moreover, there is no specific post-conflict, CMR-
related literature for Sri Lanka; therefore, to examine the Sri Lankan situation, I will 
combine Huntington’s subjective and objective civilian control theory, Alagappa’s state 
coercion theory, and Matei and Bruneau’s new conceptualization framework to identify 
CMR dimensions. Each work is interconnected to theoretical concepts of CMR, but 
different scholars use unique dimensions to explain their own case studies. Therefore, to 
examine CMR in Sri Lanka’s unique post-conflict period, Figure 1 shows a schematic 
theoretical process that is more relevant.  
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Figure 1.  Schematic Combination of CMR Model 
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Therefore, I examine the type of civilian control the Sri Lankan government uses 
to control their military while facing political competition and how effective the assigned 
role of the military is in a post-conflict setting. I also explore if there is any space to 
improve the efficiency of the military while achieving subordination.  
F. RESEARCH DESIGN 
I conduct this research as a comparative single case study because post-conflict 
Sri Lanka is a unique case where similar cases are not evident for comparison. I will look 
at various timeframes for comparison purposes. Sri Lanka is a rare case in the world, 
because when other countries are struggling to eradicate terrorism,   Sri Lanka has 
succeeded in use of force to defeat the military group that represented state-seeking 
ethnic minority.75 I will use a variety of sources like academic personnel, published 
books, journals, reports, Sri Lankan governmental publications, and newspaper articles. I 
will also use international organizations’ websites, Sri Lankan government websites, and 
military websites to examine the sphere of CMR in post-conflict Sri Lanka. 
G. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The thesis will be organized into Five chapters. The first chapter presents the 
introduction, question, and my hypothesis, including the relevance of this study to the 
larger field of CMR studies. The second chapter discusses the Sri Lankan government’s 
historical approach in controlling the military and also provides a political background of 
the country since British rule. Next, the third chapter establishes the military’s response 
to civilian control institutional mechanism and analyzes civilian and military agents’ 
interaction. The fourth chapter analyzes which CMR models have had more influence in 
different timeframes, and the fifth chapter concludes the thesis with findings and 
considers future CMR in Sri Lanka. 
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II. AN EXAMINATION OF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF 
SRI LANKAN CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS  
A new era of post-colonial celebration dawned in Sri Lanka after 1948 with the 
departure of the British. However, the ethno-nationalism that had been promoted under 
the British, with its divide and conquer strategy, continued to be a part of the political 
consolidation process. People embraced their own ethno-nationalisms and religious 
identities as a tool for mobilization in the struggle for political power. This chapter 
provides the background of the political struggle and also discusses Sri Lanka’s CMR 
from post-independence to the emergence of the LTTE. The purpose is to illustrate how 
Sri Lanka’s socio-political setting and ethno-nationalism shaped the CMR—in particular 
their effect on civilian supremacy.  
A. SRI LANKAN ELITES STRUCTURE IN POST-INDEPENDENCE 1948 -
1956  
The current organization of the Ceylon army was formed in 1949 with the help of 
ex-colonial powers. After a year of independence from British rule, the Ceylon 
government requested assistance from the British to establish a regular army. As one 
British officer stated, “The Ceylonese wanted to create a full regular army shortly after 
independence—‘overnight.’”76 Sri Lanka had a military service of volunteers and an 
officer corps entirely composed of European planters that had been set up in 1881.77 At 
that time, representation of the Sinhalese and Tamils, which constituted the major and 
minority ethnic groups was minimal in this organizational structure. Instead, colonial 
rulers recruited Burghers and mercenaries from Malay to achieve colonial standard 
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control. The British also kept the Sinhala and the Tamil representation at a minimum, 
because they saw them as mismatched with the European volunteers.78 Three Burgher 
companies and the Malay constituted the majority of this battalion structure.  
This discrimination and strategy for control was also reflected in the educational 
institutions, which fed the military. Missionary education was promoted over the 
Buddhist schools, and Christian beliefs and cultural norms were considered more 
supportive of the military’s professionalism.79 The few Tamils and Sinhalese who joined 
the military were from these Christian schools, which had a cadet corps that was the main 
provider of recruits for the established “Ceylon Defense Force” in 1910. By 1945, the 
Ceylon defense force consisted of 645 officers and 14,247 soldiers. The majority of these 
Sinhala and Tamil officers were Christians and represented the upper end middle class. 
Meanwhile, the Buddhist schools lacked a cadet corps.  
Another reason for low Sinhala participation was that the military service was not 
attractive to Sinhala Buddhists. According to Donald L. Horowitz, there were two 
reasons for this. First, Sinhala Buddhists resisted killing based on their religious beliefs. 
In addition, the caste system restricted Sinhala Buddhist youth from joining the military. 
The Sinhala Buddhist ‘govigama’ higher caste families rejected military service for their 
sons because they had lands.80 Second, Sinhala Buddhist uprisings were brutally 
suppressed by colonial militaries in the past.81 Therefore, the military had few Sinhala 
Buddhists, particularly from the rural areas, and these groups remained outside the 
military organization. Meanwhile, the British were able to include the Sinhala and Tamils 
from the coastal areas, because the colonial rulers had converted them to Christianity 
during earlier missionary work. Tamils were more highly represented because of their 
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presence in coastal areas of Jaffna, in the north where the missionary work had been the 
strongest. According to Horowitz, “Sinhalese Buddhists, two- thirds of population, 
accounted for only two-fifths of the officer corps in the pre-1956 period.” 82  
The bureaucratic institutions also reflected a similar ethno-religious structure and 
therefore shaped the elite structure. Like the Sinhala and Tamil Christians in the military, 
Tamils over-represented the majority Sinhala Buddhists by two to one in the government 
accounts services and the government’s audit services.83 British rulers had used a divide 
and conquer strategy to govern their colonies. In the case of Sri Lanka, they placed 
English speaking Tamils and Sinhalese into the high ranks of the bureaucratic 
administration. Argus Tresidder describes this situation: “[Tamils] are represented in far 
greater proportion than their numbers warrant in government, the civil service, and the 
profession.”84 However, Brian Blodgett views this scenario differently: “English 
authorities … favored the Jaffna Tamils at the expense of Sinhalese.” 85 As a result, 
Sinhala ethno-religious nationalism emerged demanding the prominence of both the 
Sinhala language and Buddhism. 
B. EARLY FORMATION OF ETHNO-NATIONALISM POLITICAL 
PARTIES  
This minimal representation in government institutions was a major grievance of 
the majority Buddhist Sinhalese. After 1920, the deteriorating relations between the two 
communities started to be reflected in the political arena. This was reflected in the 
organization of the first political party under the British, the Ceylon National Congress 
(CNC), which was organized along ethnic lines. The local political elites failed to 
establish a pluralistic national identity in Sri Lanka and instead formed ethno-nationalist 
Tamil and Sinhalese political identities. Michael Roberts describes, “The failure to bring 
together the principal Tamils and the Sinhalese associations in the period dating from the 
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split in 1921-22 to the formation of the United National Party in 1946 underlines the 
divergence in material interests and the weight of primordial loyalties as well as the 
influence of a West European model which hindered concessions to ethnic claims.”86 In 
other words, this type of model promoted by the British did not allow the needed federal 
structure.  
Ethno-nationalist identity became a popular tool to mobilize the two ethnic groups 
in Sri Lanka, which created a power struggle. Western educated Tamil elites like 
Ganapathipillai Gangaser Ponnambalam and Samuel James Veluppillai Chelvanayakam, 
motivated by India’s partition, requested a federal structure that would accommodate Sri 
Lankan Tamils’ demand for autonomy in 1947 from the British rulers.87 When Tamil 
elites’ separate state ideology came to the surface, it was opposed not only by British 
rulers but also by the majority Sinhalese, who saw this as a threat to their access and 
control of the Buddhist historical sites in northern and eastern regions.  
Grievances between the two communities started to shape the political institutions 
which, as a result, became part of the independent democracy of Sri Lanka. The Sri 
Lankan ethnic groups and classes became embedded into its newly forming political 
parties. Jagath P. Senarathne notes, “All the major ethnic groups are mobilized politically 
through parties.”88 The first major political party was the United National Party (UNP), 
established in 1946. During the early stages of independence, the UNP managed to 
incorporate all ethnic groups. However, the majority Buddhist Sinhalese aspirations were 
not fully addressed by this party, as it remained an elite-led party. Discontent soon 
became apparent. Solomon West Ridgeway Dias Bandaranaike (known popularly as 
SWRD), then a minister, resigned from the UNP government to become the face of 
Sinhalese Buddhists.  
Asoka Bandarage describes:  
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In 1956, however, while discontent with the UNP grew, Bandaranaike was 
able to tap into Buddhist religious fervor as the country celebrated the two 
thousand five hundredth year since the Buddha’s death to restore the 
island’s historical legacy as the Sinhaladipa (island of the Sinhalese) and 
Dhammadipa (island of the Buddha’s teachings).89  
This led to a division within the UNP, because the UNP’s multi-ethnic political 
party platform failed to give equal attention to the Sinhala Buddhist majority, particularly 
in rural areas.  
In opposition to the Tamil elites’ federal state demand, Bandaranaike had a 
different idea for political integration of other communities.90 He believed that 
eliminating the caste, provincial, and class differences among the Sinhalese was vital to 
promoting the nation state.91 Robert quotes Bandaranaike: “Firstly, unity among the 
Sinhalese; and secondly, whilst uniting the Sinhalese, to work for the higher unity, the 
unity of all communities.”92  
This Tamil-Sinhala difference dates back to 1920, when the Ceylon National 
Congress generated sectional nationalism.93 The local political elites failed to establish a 
pluralistic national identity to Sri Lanka and instead formed ethno-nationalist Tamil and 
Sinhalese political identities. In other words, the formation of the modern state did not 
allow for a federal structure, which may have helped quell ethno-nationalisms.  
Similarly, the Ceylon Tamil National Congress (CTNC) was split over one of 
Ceylon’s first legislative acts that restricted citizenship to those registered with seven 
years residence in Ceylon. This impacted Indian Tamil citizenship and franchise rights. 
The founder of All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC), G. G. Ponnambalam, and many 
senior leaders of CTNC, voted in favor of the bill, but the deputy of ACTC, S. J. V. 
Chelvanayakam opposed the party decision and broke away. In the early stages, high 
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caste ‘vellala’ Tamils did not recognize the Indian Tamils labor force as part of their 
community. The British rulers had imported these cheap laborers to work in the colonial 
planation sectors. Bandarage describes, “In other words, the voting was very much on 
class lines which cut across ethnicity.”94 Chelvanayakam formed the party Illankai 
Thamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK) in 1949, which was more radical and extremist.95 He 
identified caste and religious differences among the community and worked for a 
common Tamil identity. Bandarage notes, “Given that an Island-wide Tamil ethnic 
identity did not exist at this time, the ITAK worked zealously to ‘manufacture’ such an 
identity, exaggerating primordial Sinhala versus Tamil antagonism.”96  
Consequently, Bandaranaike broke away and formed the Sri Lanka Freedom 
Party (SLFP) in 1951. He was an Anglican Christian Sinhalese from an elite family and 
Oxford educated, but he identified with growing sentiments of the Sinhala Buddhists and 
converted to Buddhism. According to some analysts, he was an opportunist who noted 
that the future leadership of the UNP would not be easy to secure unless one was able to 
mobilize masses. He mobilized the majority Sinhala Buddhists’ platform in the 1956 
election, which resulted in the victory of Mahajana Ekstah Peramuna (MEP), a coalition 
front made up of the SLFP and Viplavakari Lanka Samasamaja Party (VLSP), a 
breakaway faction of the old Lanka Sama Samaja Party, (LSSP), all of which are leftist. 
This political victory was a landmark moment in the history of Sri Lanka because it 
brought Sinhalese Buddhist to power for the first time in centuries. 97 The SLFP led MEP 
coalition victory also shaped other political institutions in Sri Lanka. For example, the 
multi-ethnic oriented parties, like the UNP, which also had to realign their platforms 
toward the majority Sinhalese voters.98  
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However, despite Bandaranaike’s broader vision of a democratic socialist 
ideology, his coalition was influenced deeply by the demands of Sinhala Buddhists.99 
The major grievance of the Sinhalese was the lack of opportunities in public service. This 
led the MEP administration to pass the Sinhala Only Act in 1956 and made Sinhala as the 
official language eliminating Tamil competition from state jobs. Until then the 
administration had resisted making any similar decisions and had maintained English as 
the official language, which favored the elite. Due to resulting protests, the Sri Lankan 
government issued another gazette recognizing Tamil and English as official 
languages.100 The Tamil leaders claimed that the Sinhala language legalization would 
make Sinhalese masters.101 They also claimed that they would be left out of government 
employment as they would be required to know the language.  
This concern reestablished the 1947 demand of the ITAK, which sought a 
separate state to Tamils under a federal constitution. Bandarage notes, “With the rise of 
Sinhala linguistic nationalism, the Tamil separatist position of the ITAK, which had once 
seemed to be extremist, gained popularity.”102 The language issue became the root cause 
of Sinhala and Tamil ethnic conflict.  
From then on, the power struggle between majority and minority parties 
continued on ethno-nationalist lines. According to Ashutosh Varshney:  
In the nationalism of exclusion, a dominant group within a 
society──domestic or foreign──seeks to impose its own values on the 
various other groups within that society or seeks to exclude, sometimes 
violently, other ethnic groups from the portals of power. Typically, this 
takes the form of enforcing language, religion, or culture via control of the 
state, or excluding groups from power on the basis of ethnic characteristics 
only. In the nationalism of resistance, a dominated group opposes such a 
move and seeks to preserve its cultural identity and resist the hegemony 
and power of the dominant group.103 
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Similarly, the Sinhala and Tamil political contention can be understood as the 
majority ethnic group trying to impose its will on the minority group.  
However, this power struggle has another dimension: the insecurity of the 
majority ethnic group. The Sinhalese felt that they were outnumbered in the public sector 
by the Tamils. In addition, the Sinhalese were afraid of plantation sector Indian Tamils 
who were brought into Sri Lanka by the British rulers to work in the plantation sector. 
The Sinhalese felt that the Tamils were linked to the great neighbor India, which also 
consisted of a large Tamil community. This connection was exploited by both Tamil and 
Sinhala politicians. After the failure of the peaceful “Sathyagragya,” in 1961, which was 
carried out against the Sinhala-only act, the ITAK’s non-violent movement turned 
militant.104 On the other hand, Sinhalese insecurity pushed them into ethno-nationalism 
based political identity and they demanded more job opportunities in government 
institutions.  
C. RISING ETHNO-NATIONALISM: IMPACT ON MILITARY  
Ethnic representation in the Sri Lankan military also provided the space for 
subjective control, as it maximized one civilian group’s interest, governmental 
institutions, social class, and particular constitutional forms.105 In 1956, Sri Lanka’s new 
linguistic law, its class differences, and the religion of the majority ethnic group changed 
the recruitment pattern of Sri Lanka’s military. For example, Table 1 shows the ethnic 
composition of commissions awarded in the Ceylon Light Infantry, and Table 2 shows 
the religion compositions. It shows the shift toward subjective civilian control gained by 
one civilian group—majority Sinhala Buddhist who were associated with the MEP and 
SLFP.  
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Table 1.   Ethnic Composition of Commissions Awarded in the Ceylon Light 
Infantry, 1949–74  
Ceylon Light Infantry , Regular Force, 1949–74 ( by ethnicity; in percentage ) 
Ethnic Group  1949 -51,1954 1956-60 1963-69 1972-74 
Sinhalese 55 44 96 88 
Tamil 18 32 4 12 
Burgher 20 8 0 0 
Muslim 7 12 0 0 
Unknown 0 4 0 0 
Total  100 100 100 100 
Source: Horowitz, Donald L. Coup Theories and Officers' Motives: Sri Lanka in 
Comparative Perspective. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980.106 
Table 2.   Religion Composition of Commissions Awarded in the Ceylon 
Light Infantry, 1949–74  
Ceylon Light Infantry , Regular Force, 1949–74 ( by Religion; in percentage ) 
Religion  1949 -51,1954 1956-60 1963-69 1972-74 
Buddhist 34 40 89  
Details not 
available 
Christian 59 36 7 
Hindu 0 8 0 
Muslim 7 12 0 
Unknown  4 4 
Total  100 100 100 
Source: Horowitz, Donald L. Coup Theories and Officers' Motives: Sri Lanka in 
Comparative Perspective. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980. 
After 1962, Sinhala Buddhist representation in the military sharply increased. 
Horowitz states, “After Mrs. Bandaranaike took office in July 1960, every single cadet 
sent from Ceylon to Sandhurst was Sinhalese.”107 The previous officer corps which had 
been educated in English-dominated Christian schools had seen a decline of their 
influence in this all-Sinhala environment and notably, they launched a coup to prevent 
this trend in 1962.108 Thirty military and police high ranking officers attempted a coup 
against Prime Minister Srimavo Bandaranaike, wife of assassinated S. W. R. D 
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Bandaranaike in 1959. She survived because of the presence of a majority of Sinhala 
officers in the military, as well as in other bureaucratic institutions. According to 
Horowitz, motives seemed closely linked to the background of the conspirators, who 
were Christians, wealthy, prominent family members, and educated in prestigious 
Christian schools.109 However, according to Horowitz, the motives and corporate 
interests of officers involved in the coup were different. In 1962, Bandaranaike’s 
government faced island wide strikes and unrest based on economic reforms and Tamil 
“Sathayagarh” related riots. The government used the military to maintain public order. 
The coup leaders of the military had a different view of this situation: they believed that 
the government was unable to manage the Tamil cause and leftist party emergence, and 
that it used the military excessively for non-operational missions. Horowitz notes, “The 
officers [came] to believe that the politicians [were] unwilling or unable to manage the 
political system.”110  
In addition, during the time of the coup attempt, the officer corps divided into two 
factions. The first group, the Ceylon Artillery regiment, consisted of mainly volunteers 
who favored British traditions and were unhappy over the Bandaranaike government’s 
pro-Sinhala Buddhist stance.111 The second group, the Ceylon Light Infantry (CLI) 
regiment, was absent from the coup plot and commanded by a Sinhala Buddhist.112 The 
majority of the officers of CLI knew about the coup attempt of the artillery regiment but 
remained loyal to their commander Colonel A. R. Udugama who was well connected to 
the Bandaranaike regime.113 Family connections and relationships played a great role in 
the elite’s circle. One participant of this plot had revealed the coup arrangement to his 
father-in-law, a pro-regime parliamentarian. This tipped the plot toward the regime.114    
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Despite the division, the officer corps felt common discontent towards the overuse 
of troops for emergency duties, the unethical response to the Tamil “Sathyagraha” and 
the civilian rulers’ extensive involvement into military affairs. For example, “they [the 
politicians] told them [the military] to enforce order in the Tamil protest areas, but 
without their Tamil commander.”115 The officer corps saw this as the politicians creating 
the ethnic division and importing its social and cultural dynamics into the military, 
polluting the organizational ethics and discipline standards.116 The military elites saw this 
as Bandaranaike playing with the ethnic sentiments.117 In addition, the military saw 
discipline eroding, when Bandaranaike directly spoke with one group of artillery soldiers 
who had enacted the first ever strike in Sri Lankan military history.118 This illustrated 
that the Sri Lankan officer corps was not politically neutral.119  
In addition, the attempt indicated that the civilian rulers had failed to create an 
effective military capable of defending the country. Instead they were using it for national 
development and food production. For example, Brian Blodgett describes, “During the 
1960’s the army conducted seven missions. These operations, which were police and not 
‘true’ military missions, detracted from the army’s ability to conduct combat training—
leaving the army incapable of defending the country.”120 All of this was a consequence 
of civilian elites’ incapacity to define and design accurate military roles and allocate 
resources to carry out assigned tasks.121 However, the coup attempt failed because the 
majority of officers at the time of the coup accepted the supremacy of civilian rule due to 
ethno-nationalistic nature of the system.122  
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D. JVP INSURGENCY AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF CIVIL–MILITARY 
RELATION- 1971 
Despite the intensity of the Sinhala-Tamil clash, the first Sri Lankan armed 
struggle did not start due to ethnic and linguistic reasons but due to economic and class 
differences. The Sinhala official language and the education standardization in the 1970s 
did not help the unemployment of Sinhala youths compared to urban Sinhala Christian 
elite and Tamil youths educated in English. The two groups continued to dominate public 
sector jobs, leaving out the Sinhala rural communities. For example, Bandarage notes, 
“The best jobs still went to the well-connected, English-speaking elite, and this 
contributed to a hardening of social class boundaries within the Sinhala community.”123 
Consequently in 1971, Rohana Wijeweera, from an active Marxist rural family, formed 
Janataha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), a leftist revolutionary party. The JVP took up arms 
against the state and ordered their 100,000 members to fight against capitalism and the 
Sinhala elites.124 Many insurgents were from low economic backgrounds and belonged to 
the lower castes, as well—like karawa, vahumpara, and bathgama, compared to the high 
caste—govigama, illustrating a class difference. 125 Interestingly, the JVP demands 
aligned with the Buddhist ethno-nationalist demand for the removal of the Tamil and 
Christian elite from the power circles. In 1971, the Marxist insurgency coupled with 
Tamil discontent allowed the military to enter the civilian domestic control arena. 
According to Alagappa, domestic insurgencies minimize other institutions’ 
functions but allow for increased military control over public administration and the 
economic and commercial activities in troubled areas.126 In Sri Lanka, the government 
gave autonomy to military and police to suppress the uprising by declaring a state of 
emergency. They overruled other public administration systems in troubled areas and 
ruled those areas in a very decisive manner. In April 1971, this uprising was started and 
ruthlessly crushed within two months. Bandarage notes how the elites gave a free hand to 
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the military, “full powers of arbitrary arrest and disposal of bodies without having to 
carryout inquests or inform the relatives of those killed.”127  
The class representation in the military is not available from the period of 1969, 
but Horowitz recorded 1969 social class representation, which helps to elucidate the 
majority class representation. According to his report, the Sri Lanka Light Infantry 
regiment officer corps consisted of 75% govigama, 6 % karawa, 6 % salagama, and 13% 
of unknown caste. 128 During the 1971 JVP insurgency, the military directed its coercion 
tactics towards the Sinhala Buddhists. It is believed that nearly 1,200 to 50,000 were 
killed during the insurgency. This highlights the high-caste officer corps allegiance 
toward the high-caste political elite, which continued the subjective civilian control. 129 
In addition, international support elevated the legitimacy of civilian government 
and helped the civilian rulers consolidate political power and achieve military control.130 
The Sri Lankan government received military aid worth $8 million from China and the 
USSR. Meanwhile, in 1971, India sent its commandos to protect Sri Lanka’s national 
airport.131 Next, the JVP’s operational strategy was centered in cities and villages, which 
isolated them from their main support bases in peasant areas. As a result, the JVP fell to 
the military.  
Moreover, the government heavily relied on state coercion to suppress the JVP 
uprising in 1971. The foundation of the uprising started as the result of the government’s 
closed economic policy that maintained elites’ domination of the public sector and 
policy-making. The military was given a free hand to crush the insurgency. Since, the 
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majority military elites were from high caste and were connected to the political elites 
during the JVP insurgency periods, the Sri Lankan government’s CMR strategy was 
focused on heavy subjective control that aligned the military to them. 
E. THE EMERGENCE OF TAMIL MILITANCY: CLASS AND ETHNIC 
COMPETITION  
The Tamil society suffered similar social and class divisions as the Sinhalese. 
According to Bandarage, “the rigid caste system and ‘vellala’ domination of the Tamil 
community was also a significant factor in the rise of youth violence in the north.” 132 
Due to ‘vellala’ domination in the Tamil community, the non-vellala became increasingly 
restless and dissatisfied and therefore, turned away from ‘vellala’ as their political 
leaders. This internal struggle added to the radicalization of the marginalized Tamil 
community. In 1972, after enactment of its new constitution, Ceylon changed its official 
name to the socialist republic of Sri Lanka, which is a Sinhalese name for the country. 
The new constitution reestablished the unitary status of Sri Lanka, which ignored the 
Tamil demands for a federal structure. During this period, lower class Tamil youths 
turned against the dominant farmer caste ‘vellala.’ Subsequently, the fishing caste, the 
‘karaiyar’ became dominant during the LTTE era as the ruling class in Tamil areas.133  
In addition, Tamil youths were fed up with the ITAK’s nonviolent tactics such as 
‘Sathayagraha,’ which failed against the Sinhala Only Act to obtain a separate state. 
Instead, they were attracted to the Tamil United Front (TUF) indoctrination of armed 
struggle, which was present during at the 20th annual convention of ITAK in 1973. 134 
The new government’s language-wise education standardization policy and 1976 district 
university quota system discriminated rural Tamils. As the youth militancy grew, it 
directed its violence against the state, Sinhalese, and Tamil elite. Violence against the 
state and officials started in 1971 but increased tremendously in 1975. Meanwhile, their 
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militancy spread in the northern region, killing and threatening high caste Tamil political 
elites. The LTTE leader Prabakaran emerged from a lower middle class family; he killed 
the mayor of Jaffna, A. Duraiappa, a Tamil leader in 1975.135 Then LTTE also carried 
out a series of attacks against the Tamils who worked in police, military and other 
bureaucratic institutions. Consequently, the Tamils working in the military and police 
were treated with suspicion about their link with separatist groups. These circumstance 
prevented the Tamils from being enlisted in the police and military. As a result, a drastic 
change occurred in recruitment patterns—leaving Sinhalese to occupy the entire security 
sector.  
A separatist Tamil group used this change to indoctrinate their cadres. The TUF, 
passed a resolution known as the Vadukkodai Resolution that intended to establish a 
separate Tamil Elam state. Later, the TUF changed in to the Tamil United Liberation 
Front (TULF). The Tamils claimed the North and Eastern provinces and other areas as 
part of their territory. In addition, they had a broader strategic vison to encompass Tamils 
living in other parts of the world. For example, Bandarage explains, “It sought to 
embrace all Tamils speakers by offering Elam citizenship to Tamil-speaking people 
living in any part of the island and to Tamils of ‘Elam origin’ living in any part of the 
world.”136  
Meanwhile, in 1977, the election changed the SLFP government and Juniors 
Richard Jayewardene led UNP came in to power, and the TULF leader became the leader 
of the opposition. This gave an advantage to the UNP government to reintegrate moderate 
Tamils into the main political system. Consequently, this slowed the military action 
against the Tamil separatist movement. However, the expectation of integration failed 
because of a hard-line backlash. They feared that the UNP party would negate the Sinhala 
Buddhist majority concerns in polity and support the minority demands. Since its 
inception, the UNP party was more liberal than the SLFP. Whenever the UNP was in 
power, it was common that the SLFP and Sinhala Buddhist hardliners suspected their 
commitment to majority Sinhalese. This never ending dilemma continues to exist. 
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After the 1977 election, communal violence erupted across the island. The 
Sinhalese, fearing the Tamil separatist state, believed that the victory would affect the 
unity of Sri Lanka; yet, they directed violence to Tamils living in other places than the 
north and the east because of access issues. Tamils retaliated toward the Sinhalese living 
in the north and the east. During this period, nearly 300 victims and over 25,000 
displaced civilians were reported in the country.137 The subsequent fact-finding 
presidential commission headed by M. C. Sansoni, a Berger, in 1977 revealed that the 
politicians of both communities were responsible for the violence. The military was 
predominantly occupied by the Sinhalese, and the growing ethno-nationalist ideology 
shaped the military’s alignment with the ruling majority civilian group.  
F. IMPACT ON DOMESTIC POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND MILITARY  
The collapse of law and order increased the use of state coercion, but the military 
never challenged the civilian control. There are possibly two explanations for this. One, 
the military and police consisted of the majority Sinhalese, and their ethno-nationalist 
grouping was the same as the elites promoting their ideology. Therefore, the military 
personnel’s political priorities matched that of the civilian state. The military therefore, 
supported state coercion. For example, Darani Rajasingham-Senanayake reports that “the 
process of decolonization of military traditions turned into an exercise of politicizing the 
armed forces…objectivity as Sinhala nationalism came to dominate the state and its 
coercive apparatus, effectively marginalizing the minorities.”138 The majoritarian 
nationalism of political elites influenced the military elites, whereby it allowed subjective 
civilian control. Second, Blodgett argues that the military was ill-equipped and poorly 
trained. For example, the army did not begin weapon training until January 1978 as a 
result of the lack of ammunitions. Also since the 1962 coup attempt, the army had been 
restricted from collective training.139  
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According to Huntington, “anti-military ideologies create low military political 
power and low military professionalism.”140 In 1978, when the Tamil arms struggle was 
gaining its momentum, the Sri Lankan military was at a low professional status. The 
defense expenditure remained a low 1.5 percent in the context of an increasing 
insurgency. In addition, the military demands for reorganization were not fully backed by 
the civilian rulers. Blodgett notes, “The army ordered several studies of its organization 
in 1978. All of the studies stated that the army needed another reorganization, but they 
differed in recommendations.” 141 The reorganization remained focused on the stereo-
typed external threats instead on the looming internal conflicts which faced the country. 
The civilian rulers retained subjective control by minimizing the defense budget to limit 
military recruitment, retention, and training. In the early 1980s, despite the rising 
insurgency, the army’s missions remained focused on police and excluded the military.  
G. NEW CONSTITUTION: COMPETITION FOR POWER AND 
ECONOMIC SHARE  
 The UNP government introduced a new constitution in 1978 and expected to 
integrate the minority ethnic groups into the main polity. It replaced the majority ruling 
concept which had been in effect since the 1972 constitution. Introducing an executive 
presidency and proportional area-basis representation in the legislative body were the 
major changes to the older constitution. This system allowed the minorities to play a 
decisive role in the outcome of the competition between the two major Sinhala parties.142 
Consequently, this constitution shaped the Sinhala Buddhist decisive role in political 
competition because the Sinhalese was divided into two major parties, and it was rare for 
one party to win. Accordingly, after the 1978 constitution, whatever party secured 
majority electoral seats had to rely on minority parties to form a government.  
However, the TULF under the pressure of Tamil separatist terrorist groups 
pointed out that the new constitution also did not support federalism and decentralization 
of power. In fact, the TULF refused all party constitution enactment committee, but the 
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Muslims welcomed the changes. In 1981, the majority of Muslims were united under the 
new party, Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), which increased their decisive role in 
the parliament. The continued dissatisfaction among the Tamils and the hardliners 
representing SLFP created an ethno-nationalism paradox that impacted the more liberal 
UNP party policies. The UNP leader, J. R. Jayewardene, was known to lean towards a 
more economically liberal and secular society. David Little notes, “Jayewardene believed 
that, like the unattached forest monks for whom he had special esteem, bikkuhus should 
stick to their apolitical calling; they should provide spiritual leadership and not become a 
substitute for government.”143 Ironically, in order to win an election, he needed the 
majority of Buddhist votes. Little explains this dilemma: “the tension between his 
[Jayewardene’s] liberal sentiments and his Gaullist disposition toward central control was 
mirrored in his conflicting attitudes towards the government’s role in religion.”144 In 
addition, Jayewardene also faced the pressure towards economic liberalization from 
international institutions. He soon introduced open economic policies, which also had an 
impact on Sri Lankan politics and society. However, he increasingly had to be an 
authoritarian leader in order to control the growing discontent under his presidency due to 
increasing pressures from the Tamils, as well the left who opposed his economic 
liberalization, especially those in rural areas, who started to feel the loss of subsidies and 
financial neglect.145 Jayewardene’s economy depended upon foreign investments. To 
secure foreign funding, a stable governance and security were prerequisites. The new 
constitution made President Jayewardene a powerful leader because he headed the 
cabinet and held several chief ministerial posts besides commander-in-chief of armed 
forces.146 The president also retained the Ministry of Defense (MOD) portfolio.  
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Jayewardene executed this centralized power to suppress all opposition forces. In 
his first term, he used the UNP trade union henchmen and police teams to intimidate 
whoever challenged the external funding and economic prosperity.147 During his second 
term, he created the police special task force that is similar to police elite commandos and 
used it against the second JVP insurrection and the LTTE. Consequently, his government 
faced two challenges; first, from the Tamil separatists, and second, economically, from 
the trade union actions that opposed the removal of the state protection from private and 
foreign investments and the removal of rural subsidies. Certainly, the open economy 
increased the competition between groups. Urban Tamils and Muslims benefited from 
this new economic liberalization policy. Under the previous government, the closed 
economic policies supported state owned enterprises and local Sri Lankan products, but 
due to the new open economic policy, imported cheap products replaced the local 
services and products.  
The new policy increased foreign investments, resulting in private sector 
domination over state owned and supported businesses. Unexpectedly, liberalization in 
urban areas enhanced the ethnic conflict. In 1980, Colombo’s ethnic representation was 
50 percent Sinhalese, 22 percent Tamil, and 21 percent Muslim. While the Sinhalese 
engaged in public sector areas, the minority groups dominated the private commercial 
sector. Bandarage notes,  
Under the new economic liberalization, Sinhala entrepreneurs lost many of 
the special concessions and political patronage that they had enjoyed 
under the previous government, weakening their competiveness, thus 
enabling the Tamil and Muslim entrepreneurs who had historically 
dominated local and regional trade to re-assert their position.148  
This elevated the domination of Tamils and Muslims in the commercial sector and 
increased the Sinhala outcry against minorities augmenting the ethnic-centric 
mobilization in the cities.149  
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The open economy also disturbed the income distribution. Regardless of ethnicity, 
peasants suffered economic hardships. In 1979, the unemployment rate was as follows: 
19% low-country Sinhalese, 14% up-country Sinhalese, 11% Sri Lankan Tamils, and 6% 
Indian Tamils.150 As political structures became more ethnically biased, it dislodged the 
moderate Tamil representation in polity, and deprived open economy opportunities for 
both peasant Sinhala and Tamil youths and pushed them towards armed struggle.151 An 
instance of this country-wide discontent occurred when the urban middle class went into 
a general strike in July 1980, which took place after 40,000 workers were dismissed. 
Indeed, many of them were public sector Sinhalese, and they were never reinstated.  
H. STATE COERCION AND CMR  
To gain political domination in society and to exercise government control within 
national boundaries, the UNP government used state coercion as a tool.152 The Sri 
Lankan government used the military in Northern and Eastern regions to control the 
Tamil militancy, while using Jathika Sevaka Sangamaya (JSS), the UNP trade union, to 
suppress other trade union movements and individuals against the government. Alagappa 
asserts that when governments use the military excessively, it begins to lack legitimacy 
and, at the same time, has to depend on the military in order to stay in power.153 As a 
result, either military or other security forces have the advantage, and civilian rulers have 
to accommodate military requests and political agendas simultaneously. Accordingly, it 
leads to a larger military that is supported by a legal framework to legitimize its action.154 
In Sri Lanka, the UNP government passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) in 
1979 after considering the intensified terrorist attacks in the northern region, where many 
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Tamil police officers were targeted.155 They did this in order to ally with the military and 
use the military as a coercion tool. Following that, Jayewardene ordered the Jaffna 
military commander to eliminate terrorism within six months. Jayewardene was also able 
to use kinship links in order to work with the military. For instance, General Weeratunga, 
a relative, was in charge of this task, illustrating elements of subjective civilian control.  
According to Huntington, at the government institution level, the President and 
members of the legislature compete with each other on decisions about the military. This 
allows these competing groups to politicize the military. But in this situation, it was only 
the president who directed the military. Bandarage explains that “the continuity of 
presidential power and the five sixth majority of the UNP were ensured by imposing 
strong controls: UNP members of parliament, for instance, were required to submit 
signed undated letters of resignation to the president, which he could then use to dismiss 
MPs as he needed.”156 This indicates that there was no room for legislative competition, 
as well as the participation of professional military officer corps in devising a national 
security strategy. In such instances, subjective civilian control is evident.157 For example, 
Bandarage notes the military’s incapacity, “Like their counterparts in other countries 
facing an insurgency, they too found conventional fighting methods inadequate to fight 
an escalating guerrilla war.”158 This proves that the military agents were not in a 
dominant position to advise the civilian agents or neglected national security policy 
planning.  
The new 1978 constitution created an executive presidency and an authoritative 
command of the military. The constitution dictated the subjective control, because 
Jayewardene used his executive power to dismiss his own party members, if their 
obedience was in question. He collected earlier undated resignation letters from his party 
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parliamentarians and used the Special Task Force (STF) as a political force. In other 
words, the state coercion was directed at state agents. Moreover, the growing Tamil 
separatist movements changed the recruitment pattern along ethno-nationalistic lines, 
increasing Sinhalese domination, because the separatist Tamil groups killed Tamil police 
and military personnel and threatened them to resign from institutions. Furthermore, the 
Tamils worked in the military and police faced anti-Tamil segment challenges. This had 
prevented Tamil enlistment in the military. In contrast, the majority Sinhalese believed 
that joining the military would help protect their country from the Tamils. This sectional 
ideology helped the civilian rulers to continue the politicization of the military along 
ethno-nationalism lines and to draw politically motivated deadlines for military 
operations. As a result, during the pre-LTTE era period, CMR strategy focused on a 
combination of state coercion and subjective control.  
I. EMERGENCE OF THE LTTE AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION 
OF THE CONFLICT 
In response to government military actions, the LTTE emerged as the most 
dominant militant group among the Tamils. In July 1983, the LTTE attacked army 
convoy and killed 13 soldiers in Jaffna. The government tried to hide this news from the 
public and declared it the following day. The cover up engulfed the public with rumors 
regarding the government’s covert act. During the funeral of these soldiers on July 24, 
1983, large anti-government crowds gathered, using the funeral to express their 
frustration with the economic policy and the growing income inequity among the middle 
class. These crowds marched to the President’s house nearby.159 At this instance, the 
UNP thugs, like the JSS, diverted attention by attacking nearby Tamil shops. In addition, 
after the July 1983 ‘Black July’ incident, the UNP banned the JVP, alleging its 
involvement in the incident. The resulting anger of the Sinhalese was directed at Tamil 
businesses and Tamils living in Colombo. It was believed that wholesale and retail trade 
were in control of Tamils hands, accounting to 60 and 80 percent of the both trade 
respectively.160 The UNP government failed to stop these mobs and deliberately delayed 
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imposing curfew in Colombo. Mobs killed 200 Tamils and forced another 100,000 to 
seek shelter in refugee camps. Nevertheless, 30,000 private sector employees became 
unemployed as the result of the burning down of their industries and businesses. While 
the majority of Sinhalese did not join the mob violence, internationally, all Sinhalese 
were condemned. As a result of this ethnic violence, Sinhala, Tamil, and Muslim groups 
started to migrate away from threatened areas shifting the demographics of the country 
towards more ethnically-concentrated areas. 
Incidences of violence saw an escalation in 1984-1985. The LTTE targeted many 
economic and highly-populated centers in Colombo and the southern part of the country. 
The LTTE and the security forces were alleged for reprisal attacks that killed many 
civilians. With the help of India, the LTTE gradually transformed its capabilities from 
guerrilla tactics to hybrid terrorist conventional maneuvers. Bandarage notes, “Within a 
year [1983] of Indira Gandhi’s policy decision, the number of Sri Lankan Tamil training 
camps in Tamil Nadu had increased to 32.” 161 They were trained, financed, and armed 
by Indian Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) agents as a part of India’s foreign policy 
to stop Sri Lanka’s shift towards the west in order to maintain India’s hegemony in the 
region. The LTTE started ethnic cleansing in the Tamil-claimed homeland territories. The 
majority of Muslims living in the eastern province were also subjected to the LTTE 
massacres. For example, Bandarage reports, “Armed Tamil separatists killed hundreds of 
Muslims and destroyed Muslim property worth billions of rupees.”162 On November 30, 
1984, they had killed 100 Sinhala settlers, and, to reciprocate, the military had killed 63 
Tamils. The LTTE traumatized the southern Sinhalese by blowing up car bombs in the 
commercial city Colombo, and by targeting the Sinhalese places of worship like the 
Temple of the Tooth relic in Kandy and the sacred city Anuradapura in 1985, which 
claimed the lives of more than 150 worshippers.163  
By 1986, in the Northern and Eastern regions, the army camps were sieged and 
the government institutions were crippled in Jaffna district. To regain state political 
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control, the Sri Lankan military conducted its first division level operation in 1987 and 
almost succeeded in eliminating the separatist terrorists.164 However, Prime Minister 
Rajiv Gandhi stopped the military campaign due to Tamils’ propaganda and the growing 
pressure in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. The Tamil and Tamil Nadu politicians alleged 
that the government of Sri Lanka denied essential supplies to Tamils living in troubled 
areas and directed carpet bombings at Tamils. However, in reality, the state never stopped 
relief supplies to Tamils living in LTTE controlled areas, and their commitment to the 
care and protection of civilians was commended by many humanitarian agencies.165 
Despite this fact, India violated Sri Lanka’s air space on June 4, 1987, and dropped relief 
supplies to Tamils leaving the government helpless; Bandarage explains the sequential 
events in June 1987, “Outside the region, the international reaction to India’s move was 
muted, and Sri Lanka felt abandoned by the western powers.”166  
The internationalized nature of the conflict elevated Sinhala nationalist sentiments 
not only in society but also in the military. Bandarage explains, “There was also wide 
spread popular sympathy for the anti-Indian and anti-separatist cause.”167 The military 
was not satisfied with the government decision to hold the operation, because between 
1981-1989, they had lost nearly 951 soldiers.168 These situations increased the tensions 
between civilians and the military. Yet, Jayewardene did not have the option to refuse 
Indian intervention. According to Bandarage:  
Despite the fact that that Operation Liberation had been near victory… 
Jayewardene was pressured by… Indian claim that the Sri Lankan armed 
forces were not capable of beating the Tamil insurgents into surrender and 
that the war was unwinnable. Thus Jayewardene agreed to the terms laid 
down by the Indians in the interest of what was considered ‘sheer national 
survival.’ 169 
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Therefore, it was forced to agree to the merging of northern and eastern regions 
into one administrative province and advised to amend the constitution for power 
devolution. This direction formed the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement to Establish Peace and 
Normalcy in Sri Lanka. Further, the intention was to allow the Tamils to govern their 
ethnic majority living areas. Accordingly, India promised to stop funding, training, and to 
return all militant groups to Sri Lanka. In fact, an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) 
was to come into the country, and IPKF was they mandated to disarm the terrorists 
groups. Instead, the Sri Lankan military had to stop operations in Tamil areas. These 
conditions were not accepted by many opposition parties including the Prime Minister 
Ranasinghe Premadasa from the same ruling party UNP and some other important 
political figures.170 Despite the strong nationalist opposition, the Indo-Sri Lanka 
agreement was signed on July 29, 1987, through the use of curfew and emergency law.171 
The JVP, who went underground after the 1983 proscription, re-merged and carried out 
violent protests and challenged the accord and the state economic policy.  
J. EMERGENCE OF SECOND SINHALA UPRISING – JVP 1987-90 AND 
CMR IN DOMESTIC TURMOIL  
The JVP regained its social class mobilization in this time against the economic 
liberalization policy that favored the private sector, removal of subsidies, and the 
nationalist themes like anti-Indian and anti-separatism. The island wide protests and 
unrest crippled the government’s rule of law and challenged its legitimacy. As Alagappa 
describes, when a government is contested by domestic and international threats, it uses 
coercion to regain the stability. Consequently, the government increased the military 
influences.172  
The JVP fought against the government between 1987 and 1989. The SLFP, 
MEP, and some of the UNP members also protested against the Indo-Lanka peace 
accord. The military had an anti-Indian and anti-separatist mindset, with some sympathy 
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toward the JVP armed struggle. For example, while inspecting the guard of honor, the 
Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was attacked by a navy solider who was in the 
parade.173 This incident happened shortly before the peace accord was signed reflecting 
the military’s anti-Indian sentiments.  
However, the military did not disobey or become involved in challenges to the 
government, although its size increased tremendously after 1985. It went from 16,000 to 
40,000 soldiers by 1987.174 First, the soldiers came from rural areas and their job security 
was paramount in feeding their family members. The expansion of the military created 
job opportunities to Sinhala youths. Every government that came to power had to 
increase the defense budget, resulting in the increased numbers and capabilities of 
security forces. Bandarage notes “Toward the end of the 1990s, approximately half of the 
Sri Lankan government’s defense expenditures went for salaries and wages.”175 The 
same author describes, “In 1990, 30.4 percent of all households and 34.7 percent of all 
households in the rural sector were below the poverty line,”176 and in 1989, 20 percent of 
the unemployed were youths below 20 years of age.177 The military recruiters were from 
rural villages. Interestingly, the JVPs cadres were also from villages, but they were 
educated youths, undergraduate dropouts, teachers, and university student. Whereas, the 
recruiters who joined military had little educational qualification and few alternative 
means to live. The economic benefits bonded soldiers into the military institution rather 
than to their social class.178 In addition, the government’s legal support to curb the 
insurgency elevated military autonomy in operational design. Furthermore, the UNP 
government used rival services, like police elite commandos. In addition, the PTA act 
provided autonomous status to the security apparatus, which covered their many arbitrary 
arrests and detention. Overall, the military had many benefits, and therefore there was no 
reason to challenge the government. According to Bruneau and Matei, a sufficient 
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resource allocation to the military usually leads to its effectiveness, and indirectly 
professionalization, in terms of increase in expertise.179 In addition, an increase in 
resources keeps the military content, hence it will be less prone to threaten the 
government. In Sri Lanka, the expansion of the military in terms of high recruitment 
during this time took away some of the discontent among the Sinhalese and the military. 
Between 1987 and 1990, the JVP insurgency was in a commanding position. The 
universities were shut down due to large student protests. Bandarage describes, “By 
November 1988 there was ‘near anarchy,’ and unseen parallel JVP government …seemed 
to be running the south.”180 During the 1988 presidential election, they intimidated the 
voters in south, while the LTTE did the same in the north. R. Premadasa became the 
president with lowest voter turnout in Sri Lankan history—only 50-55 percent of voters 
casted their votes.181 He came to power on the platform of opposing the IPKF presence, 
and soon after coming to power, he requested the Indian government to call off the IPKF 
mission.  
Meanwhile, the IPKF failed to decommission the LTTE and, instead, engaged in a 
bloody fight with the LTTE. The IPKF also accounted for many human rights abuses and 
some humiliated retreats in the battles undermined the credibility of IPKF.182 In fact, 
when Rajiv Gandhi refused to call back the IPKF, Premadasa used the LTTE to pressure 
the Indian government.183 In 1990, the IPKF left the country without any success. They 
lost over 1,500 soldiers and had spent $1.25 billion.  
Meanwhile, Premadasa earned the sympathy of the lower social classes of all 
ethnic groups because he was the first non-elite family member to rise to the highest 
political rank. In 1989, he invited the JVP and LTTE for a negotiated settlement; the 
LTTE agreed and JVP refused because in the south JVP was the major force and saw no 
reasons to negotiate. Whereas, in the north, the LTTE was weakened. The LTTE was 
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seeking an alliance with the state using Premadasa’s anti-Indian sentiments to acquire 
arms from government to fight with IPKF, and to eradicate other Indian proxy groups 
like the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), People's Liberation 
Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) and Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization 
(TELO). The fight among these groups caused more deaths in Sri Lanka and India. 
Finally, the LTTE was able to consolidate and become the sole representative of ethnic 
Tamils. Other Tamil groups were marginalized in this process. 
During these two insurgency periods, the civilian government further equipped 
and professionalized the military. For example, the military officers received training 
from Pakistan and hired western experts. Blodgett notes, “Throughout the decade [1980-
90], the army changed from a ceremonial force incapable of defending the country to a 
reasonably well-equipped force capable of halting insurgencies with unconventional 
tactics.”184 Meanwhile, the government used subjective and state coercion control 
mechanism while professionalizing their military.  
After the IPKF took over the camps from the Sri Lankan military in the north and 
east regions, the state transported the Sri Lankan military from the north to the south to 
fight the JVP insurgency. The JVP threatened the soldiers to resign and join their 
movement; but they failed in this attempt. The JVP threat opened the space for some 
politicized military personnel and paramilitary consisting of the PLOTE and TELO 
personnel to conduct operation against the JVP. Bandarage notes, “Posters began to 
appear in prominent places throughout the south, threating that for each of the army’s 
relatives killed, 12 relatives of JVP supporters would be killed in return.”185 By the end 
of November 1989, including the JVP leader Wijeweera, 60,000 Sinhala deaths were 
reported in diminishing the second JVP insurgency.      
Meanwhile, in 1990, the LTTE had a secret pact with President Pramadasa, in 
which the President had agreed to withdraw some strategic Sri Lankan military camps.186 
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However, they bluffed by sending a committee to negotiate but secretly prepared for a 
military offensive.187 The LTTE managed to capture large stocks of the Indian army’s 
weaponry and became stronger. It also introduced a pass system to Tamils to move in and 
out of their claimed territory, as well as a taxing and administration system to support its 
arms struggle. This extended LTTE’s global network for fundraising and the diaspora 
lobby gained the international states and non-state actors’ support for their cause.188 
However, they gained further recognition after killing the ex-Indian Prime Minister Rajiv 
Gandhi in 1991 but, consequently, lost the Tamil Nadu sanctuary.  
During this period, CMR of Sri Lanka continued heavily along the lines of 
subjective civilian control under the executive presidency but training and resource 
evidence points to increased effectiveness of the military. Moreover, the state failed to 
strengthen institutionalization of the legislative body as well as an oversight mechanism 
and used the state coercion to tame the northern terrorists. This freedom of act increased 
military influence in the affected areas leading to some isolated human rights abuses. For 
objective civilian control, according to Huntington, the military should be 
professionalized through training because training keeps the forces occupied. In Sri 
Lanka, during the civil war, the government tried to equip the military, but western 
countries, in fear of a coup, refused to support the government.189 The state increasingly 
relied on private companies to provide anti-terrorist training to soldiers.190 Therefore, 
professionalization activities continued during this period. 
 After Sri Lanka’s -independence in 1948 to 1990s CMR was shaped by three 
insurrections. Two in the south, left-radicalization led by JVP in 1971, and in 1987, 
second JVP insurrection and northern insurgency of Tamil separatist movements. To 
suppress those, the governments relied on state coercion; therefore, the military became 
politicized, and   the MOD  and and enactment of the PTA offered legal backing for 
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military operations. This led to abuse of power and several instances of human rights 
abuses. The common reason was lack of legislative and non-governmental oversight; this, 
indeed, supports subjective control. 
Moreover, CMR was unchallenged during the JVP insurrection and the Tamils’ 
separatist war, because the military provided job security for the peasant youth who 
joined the military. They were also politicized along the lines of ethno-nationalism as 
majority Sinhalese representation. Certainly, the military was aligned with the majority 
society’s displeasure with Indian involvement and the threat it posed. These sentiments 
against India unified all social forces seeking a unified Sri Lanka, testing popular demand 
verses class incentives and the professionalism of CMR. The military accepted civilian 
supremacy, while also illustrating professionalism.  
 51 
III. CIVILIAN CONTROL AND INSTITUTIONAL 
MECHANISMS: SRI LANKAN CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS  
After 1990, the LTTE-led separatist conflict continued to shape Sri Lanka’s civil-
military relations. During this time, there were several military setbacks due to domestic 
and international challenges, which tested the loyalty of the military elites toward the 
political system. However, the civilian leaders’ control over the military remained stable. 
In addition, after the conflict in 2009, the civilian leaders were able to change role of the 
military from a firefighter counter insurgency force to a firefighter national development 
force. This chapter discusses civilian control and institutional mechanisms, and it 
analyzes civilian and military interactions through periods of civilian leadership. 
A. REINFORCING CONTROL THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL 
COLLABORATION: EXECUTIVE COMMAND, 1989-1994 
The LTTE conflict and JVP uprising challenged Premadasa’s era, but the military 
supported Premadasa by accepting his command, even though the LTTE resumed its 
attacks on the military with weapons which Premadasa had provided. Despite the fact that 
he armed the LTTE, the military accepted the constitutional executive command for 
various reasons. First, President Premadasa was the Commander in Chief of the armed 
forces. Second, the public opinion against the IPKF justified his action. In addition, after 
his failed negotiation strategy, he increased military strength and capabilities. Also, while 
he faced internal party dissent, his position allowed him to keep the civil and military 
opposition divided. He was the first president in the history who faced impeachment 
because of his armament of the LTTE and nepotism. President Premadasa had not only 
armed the LTTE to fight against the IPKF but also closed many strategic army camps 
because he believed that the LTTE was sincere about peace negotiations.191 Later, during 
the impeachment process, leading politicians such as L. Athulathmudali and G. 
Dissanayake, who were members of his party (UNP) went against Premadasa and became 
his main competitors. These internal disputes in party politics and arming of the LTTE 
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did not change the military stance because constitutional power of the president had 
allowed removing and reinstating of the officers. This president’s power to politicize the 
military and the executive command mechanism increased the subjective control during 
this period.  
However, there were unintended consequences of this blatant political opposition 
and competition. While the senior military positions were political, in that the president 
had power to remove the commanders, this caused the senior officers’ to remain neutral 
and refrain from political affiliations. They knew party politics were temporary and could 
have negative impact on their military careers.192 Eventually, the un-intended 
consequence of this was increased professionalism, which equates, based on Huntington 
theory, objective control.193 In addition, while some officers used a strategy of 
maintaining ties with the second line of leadership in each major party in order to obtain 
better positions, it actually decreased subjective control. Burger notes, “The obvious 
strategy was for each officer to cultivate close ties with a factional leader in major parties. 
While these ties may have helped prevent coups, they also prevented the development of 
autonomous forces.”194 As a result, subjective control became objective control and the 
combination of both helped to control the military.  
Meanwhile, the military refused to surrender as ordered by the president to the 
LTTE, but it did not cause any contestation between civilian ruler and the military agents 
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because the refusal led to a more effective action. In 1990, the LTTE wanted the police 
and military removed from north and east provinces; it demanded the Sri Lankan police 
and military surrender. Premadasa attempted to negotiate a settlement. The president 
gave his consent to surrender through the Colombo police chief to the police stations in 
the east because the LTTE had promised the government safety of all security personnel. 
However, the LTTE killed 600 policemen on June 11, 1990.195 For example, Shamindra 
Ferdinando reports, “President Premadasa turned a blind eye to what was going on. 
Instead of taking up the issue with the LTTE, the President directed the army to cooperate 
with the LTTE! Gen. de Silva has admitted that the army was taken by complete surprise 
when the LTTE swung into action in Batticaloa.”196 In contrast to these orders, 
operational level troops retaliated the LTTE threat. Ferdinando quotes Rear Admiral 
Razeek (Retd) describing the second week of June in 1990: 
Razeek said: “I felt Vice Admiral Silva’s instructions meant that I could 
deploy troops to neutralise enemy positions established during the ongoing 
truce. Having decided to take on the enemy, I briefed officers and men 
that enemy positions threatening the Elara base should be neutralised, 
regardless of the consequences.”197 
Similarly, many military camps refused to follow that command. The LTTE cut 
off the main supply routes in order to isolate army camps in the north and east provinces. 
This situation demanded joint operations to restore the freedom of movement to and from 
those camps. By then the military had improved its capability to operate jointly.198 The 
military launched joint operations like “Thrividabala” and “Sea Breeze” which provided 
the reinforcement and security of these camps.199 During this period, Premadasa’s 
commitment to improve the military capabilities lessened the officers’ mood to intervene 
for taking over the government. For example, Blodgett explains, “Likewise, Lt. Gen. 
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Wansingha wanted tanks to provide the necessary firepower when needed, and on 14 
October 1991, the SLA received 25 T -54/55 tanks purchased from Poland which became 
operational in 1992.” 200  
Moreover, in 1990, the army created its third division and procured long range 
artillery guns and tanks. Therefore, when the opposition initiated the impeachment based 
on the fact that he had armed the LTTE, the president’s consent to the military 
leadership’s demands illustrates that the CMR was undisputed because Premadasa’s prior 
actions had negatively impacted the military, so, he had to provide them with new 
military hardware. Additionally, the size of the army was increased from 70,000 to 
89,000 during the 1991-92 period. These actions allowed civilian leadership to obtain the 
loyalty of military.     
In 1990, President Premadasa adopted the strategy of “escalation of conflict while 
talking peace” which the U.S. President L. Johnson had used during 1965 Vietnam War. 
This allowed President Premadasa to use state coercion and negotiations simultaneously 
to win the hearts and minds of moderate Tamils and Sinhalese. The increase in violence 
demanded more counter-insurgency military operations and law and order maintenance in 
war torn areas, which led the military leadership to focus only on internal conflict and 
prevented equipping and training military for external national threats. Therefore, the 
military deviated from its major macro defending role and moved into a firefighter role, 
which undertook internal security matters. As the commander of chief, the president 
agreed to the military agents’ plans for the defeat of the LTTE. Blodgett notes: 
Plans for the defeat of the LTTE on the Jaffna Peninsula were drawn up, 
but after a detailed assessment of the situation, the SLA decided that it 
first needed to expand its perimeters at Palaly to give the army a wide 
bridgehead with more options. Because of the need for additional troops in 
the North, the SLA requested, and received, permission to reduce the 
number of troops in the East.201  
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This indicates an instance in which civilian leadership used objective civilian 
control, and the President allowed the military to manage violence without interference in 
its operational strategy.  
B. REINFORCING CONTROL THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL 
COLLABORATION: INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISM 1989 -1994 
According to Bruneau and Matei’s framework, the civilian control is a form of 
authority, an institutional mechanism that provides an oversight and professional 
standards, all of which are expected to support military effectiveness. These mechanisms 
allow civilians in providing guidance for military through laws and regulations.202 
During the period between 1989 and 1994, Sri Lanka was under the rule of the UNP 
party and the country’s security sector organized into the National Security Council 
(NSC), Ministry of Defense (MOD), army, navy, and air force. In addition, police, a 
Special Task Force (STF) and intelligence agencies were connected to the NSC, which is 
the policy-making national security body. To improve CMR, inter-connectedness of these 
agencies with legislative and executive branches have contributed by allowing military 
agents to participate in national defense policy-making.  
The above-mentioned NSC mechanism had existed informally since 1970.203 The 
NSC was comprised of the chairperson-president, the deputy minister for defense, 
secretaries to the president and MOD, the commanders of the three services, the inspector 
general of police, and directors of the intelligence services. The three service 
commanders acted as the principal advisers for their departments.204 The president made 
the final decision on any policy matter which was then channeled through the MOD for 
implementation. The MOD was responsible for promotions, appointments, budgetary 
allocations and procurements. However, other than the auditors’ general department, 
which oversaw the public fund usage, there were no legislative bodies or defense 
committees which had the power to oversee and scrutinize military functions. Therefore, 
                                                 
202 Matei, “A New Conceptualization of Civil Military Relations,” 30. 
203 Senarathne, “Security Establishment,” 187. 
204 Ibid. 
 56 
pre-Premadasa-era institutions did exist, but they were ineffective because of the 
subjective nature of constitutional power. 
The executive branch’s subjective control nature minimized the military advisers’ 
role in NSC and defense strategy planning. As a result, the security of military was 
endangered. During early 1990, senior military leadership and the secretary of defense 
failed to advice or lacked the expertise to influence the president about military 
preparedness and waited until the escalation began in June 1990. Ferdinando explains, 
“His security and international affairs advisors, Gen. Cyril Ranatunga and Bradman 
Weerakoon remained mum. Although Gen. Ranatunga had been subsequently critical of 
President Premadasa’s style of peacemaking, he never dared to express his opinion before 
the President’s assassination on the early afternoon of May Day 1993.”205 This illustrates 
a clear failure of the MOD and interagency connectedness and also highlights the 
prevailed subjective control of executive command allowed the LTTE to gain more 
ground.   
Interestingly and ironically, the LTTE conflict led to growing defense 
expenditure, helping build a well-organized professionalized military. Soon after the 
peace negotiations failed in 1990, the Elam War II commenced. The escalation of the 
conflict demanded more budgetary allocations and procurements. In 1990, 4.5% of the 
GDP was spent on the military.206 To cover the defense expenditures, the government 
imposed a defense levy tax of 1% for goods and services. By 1994, the army had been 
organized into three divisions and four task forces, while the numbers rose to 105,000 
troops.207 In 1990, the air force had 35 fixed-wing aircraft and 23 rotary-wing aircraft, 
out of which 23 were combat air craft.208 By 1994, it acquired seven Chinese F-7 jet 
fighters for air defense, four ‘Pucara’ ground attack aircraft, six Mi-17 transport 
helicopters. Similarly, the navy purchased 28 naval assets ranging from patrol boats to 
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landing crafts. The army’s role in counter-insurgency elevated it as the predominant 
service and two other services became support role providers to army to carry out ground 
military operations. These new military assets and the increased number of troops 
improved each service’s professionalism and institutional connectivity among stake 
holder channels of the services. It became a supportive factor for the improved CMR.  
The military invested in professionalizing and through the MOD facilitation, it 
secured foreign training opportunities and obtained budgets for development of combat 
effectiveness. In 1991, the army launched an intensive jungle training course to improve 
each soldiers’ combat effectiveness.209 Moreover, in 1994, the army launched a battalion 
level training program for each battalion to educate fighting in built up areas (FIBUA). 
These training programs contributed to increase military expertise in managing violence, 
but the MOD control over the allocated military budgets were detrimental for those 
professionalism programs. However, the MOD did not interfere in military training 
doctrines, nor did it conduct any review on them. It supported the military budget 
demands and training. Blodgett explains, “In 1994, the army commander realized that 
units were still not properly trained in jungle and guerrilla warfare and he directed that 
every battalion receive jungle training.”210 In addition, officers received training from 
India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the U.S. military. Accordingly, these training courses 
increased military professionalism—a prerequisite to achieve objective control.211 
Therefore, this limited involvement of the MOD and other institutions helped 
professionalize the military, which then allowed for civilian leaders to elevate objective 
control.  
The military was used as a political tool to restrict the LTTE violence not to 
eliminate it. According to Paul Shemella, firefighter’ countries often use their forces to 
assist civilian authorities to fight against insurgencies, combatting terrorism and 
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providing humanitarian assistance.212 In this context, the Sri Lankan civilian authorities 
set the objective of eliminating the LTTE insurgency. The MOD controlled budgetary 
allocations of each service and examined its relevance to the designated role. The service 
commanders had to submit their respective service’s annual capital and recurrent 
budgetary demands to the MOD for approval. The military gained the control of 
insurgency operations, but it was not able to achieve a full victory due to the president’s 
belief in negotiated settlement. For example, Blodgett notes, “The numerically larger and 
superior equipped SLA slowly defeated the LTTE although they did suffer several 
serious losses. The cease-fire forced the SLA to halt their advance and allowed the LTTE 
time to reorganize and rearm.”213 These setbacks did not affect the civilian and military 
agents’ interaction because the institutional control mechanism allowed enough budget to 
improve joint operation capabilities and incentives of the military, like foreign training. 
More importantly, MOD control did not challenge the military institutions’ internal 
procedures and operational orders, which allowed the military autonomy.  
C. REINFORCING CONTROL THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL 
COLLABORATION: EXECUTIVE COMMAND, 1994-2005 
When President Chandirka Kumaratunga Bandaranaike took office in 1994, she 
had to face raging war, establish control of a military facing political rivalries, and 
navigate pressure from external peace-brokers. She led the Peoples’ Alliance (PA) 
coalition party which consisted of the SLFP, the Communist Party, the MEP, Sri Lanka 
Muslim Congress (SLMC), and other small leftist parties. She defeated Mrs. Srima 
Dissanayake, the UNP candidate. The internationalized nature of the Tamil conflict 
advocated for a political solution of the ethnic conflict. Chandrika was educated in Paris, 
and her victory was welcomed by the non-government organizations (NGOs), the 
international community, and the groups favoring a federalist solution because she 
accepted the ethnic nature of the conflict and regional autonomy solution.214 Her 
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government started negotiations with the LTTE in 1994 and signed a ‘Cessation of 
Hostilities’ on January 5, 1995. This signed agreement was monitored by Norway, 
Canada, and the Netherlands. The military remained loyal during this period. 
The government presented a ‘Devolution Package,’ which addressed several 
grievances of the Tamils. It proposed unions of regions within a unitary Sri Lanka, which 
would transform present provinces into regional councils, each with a governor and its 
own regional council with the power to maintain law and order, to institute its own 
judicial system, and to control education, public services, and finance management. In 
addition, a regional police and tax collecting administrative body would be installed; 
however, the defense, national security, foreign affairs, immigration, currency, and 
international economic affairs would remain under the control of central government.215 
Chandrika appointed Anuruddha Ratwatte, a retired colonel of the volunteer force and 
also her uncle, as her deputy defense minister. She also moved close senior level generals 
into the high-ranking positions, such as General Daluwatte, as commander of the army. 
He had been accused of failure of command previously. Frederica Jansz reports, 
“Daluwatte maintained that since the two courts of inquiry, he had been cleared of all 
allegations by President Chandrika Kumaratunga in her capacity as Commander in Chief 
of the security forces and police.”216 In another case, Major General Jayawardena was 
appointed as overall operation commander and later he became the secretary of MOD. 
The Island defense reporter says, “Maj. Gen. Jayawardena is known to be a close 
confidante of the President.”217 These actions helped her to gain military support and 
control of the military through subjective control. 
However, there were efficiency consequences to this subjective control. The 
military leaders accepted the president’s command failing to provide expertise to 
maintain an effective military in the event of failed negotiations. Her moves towards 
peace-negotiations sidelined the military’s strength compared to the LTTE because this 
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‘Devolution Package’ was strongly supported by peace brokers, the peace lobby of NGOs 
and other international donors. There were indications that the senior military leadership 
believed negotiations undermined the military preparations for another round of conflict. 
For example, until 1995, when the Riviresa Operation began, there was no major 
recruitment drive, and the recruits were not trained properly. This affected follow-on 
operations and retreats for the military. For example, Iqbal Athas reports, “Certainly 
recruits have to be inducted into operational area but experienced military officials say 
this must be done on the completion of advanced recruit training wherein they are pitted 
into operational duties in a mix with trained cadres. To do otherwise is to expose recruits 
unnecessarily to fatal situations.”218 This highlighted the lack of professional standard 
maintenance and continuation of subjective control. Moreover, according to Bruneau and 
Matei’s new conceptualization framework, this situation illustrated failure of military 
agents’ expertise on identifying number of troops for future role and missions as well as 
the executive command oversight in military affairs, which was needed to maintain an 
effective military.   
The military was under subjective control and missions were unchanged during 
Chandrika’s presidency. According to Huntington, civilian leaders who want to assert 
their own views in military policy do not wish for a politically neutral officer corps and 
subordinate the officer corps for their own gains.219 Similarly, Chandrika used her close 
confidants (such as General Jayawardena) to accept short-sighted military strategy 
designed to gain political objectives rather than eliminating the LTTE. She adopted a 
‘war and peace’ policy and never continuously targeted the LTTE. For example, Crisis 
Group Asia reports, “This led to a shift by Kumaratunga from a pro-peace agenda to the 
ineptly titled ‘war for peace’ policy, in which military action was meant to dislodge the 
Tigers, while a political solution was offered to the Tamil people.”’220 As many had 
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speculated, the peace negotiations collapsed, after the LTTE withdrew from the 
agreement in April 1995 because of the LTTE’s disagreement on disarmament 
conditions, and the SLMC’s demand for a separate south-east province for Muslims.221 
Moreover, this package was subject to the strong criticisms of Sinhala nationalist 
movements. Soon after it broke off peace negotiations, the LTTE launched attacks 
against the military and civilians.222 At the President direction, the military captured 
Jaffna town within 47 days in December 1995 using three divisions.223 By 1997, the 
military controlled the Jaffna peninsula and achieved the objective of cutting off Jaffna 
peninsula from the rest of the country and taking it under government control. This 
challenged two dimensions of Huntington model.  
Despite the fact that the military was under subjective control, the military 
achieved success. According to Huntington, subjective control means like infiltrating 
military decision-making, using service rivalries, using politically close generals for 
command and control increases antimilitary ideology resulting in low military political 
power and low military professionalism.224 However, in the Sri Lankan case, the military 
did not fall short of professionalism. Instead, the military illustrated that they were 
professional enough to carry out the civilian leader’s assigned task regardless of its short-
sighted nature, this increased objective control. This contradicts Huntington’s subjective 
control theory, which leads to low professionalism instead of objective control. 
Therefore, this military success disproves Huntington model because this operational 
success illustrates that when subjective control increases, it could lead to a more 
professional military. 
In addition, according to state coercion model, this situation could be attributed to 
increased military influence in the political arena, but in this situation, it absorbed into 
subjective and objective control preventing military influences. On the other hand, the 
military was equipped to carry out these tasks from 1995-1997, but later exhausted its 
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men and material, which highlights some failures in maintaining balanced control and 
effectiveness at affordable cost, as described in the new conceptualization model.225 
Nevertheless, this highlighted that the civilian leader used combination of CMR models 
to ascertain civilian control.   
Unfortunately, this military success was short-lived as LTTE’s counter offensive 
reversed the military victories. Notably these setbacks did not affect CMR because even 
though the president advocated a wrong national security strategy by using her confidant 
senior military agents, she had to rectify those mistakes; therefore, she allocated more 
budgets and incentives. The military adopted a conventional strategy in order to recapture 
the area, but this military strategy demanded more troops on ground. The LTTE used 
cease fire agreements to improve its organizational and military capabilities to manage 
the violence. As the LTTE attacks created more national security challenges, there were 
increased military demands. By 1995, the military had created three divisions, increasing 
its personnel strength. These developments in the military raised the average defense 
expenditure to 6% of the GDP during the years 1993 to 1996. In 1996, the defense 
expenditure was 21.6% of the total government budget.226 While military spending 
helped to improve professionalism through training, these economic incentives helped 
ascertain subjective control. However, in comparing low-cost effectiveness, according to 
new conceptualization CMR model, it was evident that the government expenditure in 
1996 on conflict was futile due to failed military strategy. However, the overall positive 
effect on CMR was undisputed because military expansion created higher positions for 
officer corps and maintained their loyalty. 
Chandrika and her uncle, General Ratwatte directed the military and intervened 
for operational matters limiting military agents’ expertise. This minimized the voice of 
military autonomy in participation in defense policy matters allowing consolidation of 
subjective control. Ratwatte directed the operation to capture Jaffna and, after the victory, 
he was promoted to the rank of General by the President. In July 1996, the LTTE overran 
a large military base in Mullaitive and killed 1200 soldiers, illustrating the problem with 
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promoting un-professional civilians to military office. This base was isolated and military 
agents failed to reinforce and protect it. Consequently, in 1997, the government launched 
another offensive—Jayasikuru—to open a land supply route from the north central 
province to the Jaffna peninsula along the A-9 road from the town of Vauniya to Jaffna. 
At this time, no senior officer challenged the military’s weak strategy affecting the 
effectiveness of military assets. For instance, due to military failure, the recruitment 
process was not successful. Blodgett notes, “In the second quarter of 1996, the SLA 
sought to recruit 10,000 troops. Only 1,800 applicants applied.”227 Despite an increased 
defense budget, there was a man-power shortage. In addition, poorly trained soldiers 
were sent into battle. As a result, the military could not hold the areas captured during the 
‘Jayasikuru’ operation. Subsequently, the LTTE managed to attack weakly held military 
positions. By 1999, the government military campaign proved to be a failure; the ‘Wanni 
Debacle’ commenced in the north of Vauniya and the LTTE recaptured the area and cut 
off Jaffna. However, during these setbacks, the military did not respond negatively to the 
executive command’s negligence and military humiliation because both political and 
military leadership was responsible for the great loss of men and material.  
For example, Bandarage notes: 
As military analyst Iqbal Athas and others have commented, the 
opportunisms and bloated egos of politicians and top-level military men 
were responsible for the failure of conventional strategies in the guerrilla 
war and the massive sacrifice of the lives of ordinary soldiers in debacles 
such as those of Vanni and Elephant Pass.228  
Moreover, the military provided jobs to poor rural youth and eased the economic 
hardships of their families. This politically supported the regime as it boosted 
employment. Therefore, despite the fact of military setbacks, the soldiers remained in the 
service. Bandarage notes, “By 2000, 5% of the Sri Lankan population, mostly rural poor, 
were estimated to be living on the salaries of soldiers, 400,000 urban poor were also 
engaged in security and other services in the private sector linked to the war 
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economy.”229 This situation illustrates that the civilian leadership overall used military 
institution for political purposes and subjective nature of her control strategy formed the 
military into jobs, providing a mechanism for rural, low-educated youths. Therefore she 
was able to maintain military control.  
However, these actions could not prevent military losses. By 2000, the military 
lost Kilinochchi and Elephant Pass military camps. Bandarage explains, “As 10,000 Sri 
Lankan troops were withdrawn, 30,000 other troops were trapped in the Jaffna peninsula 
without access to the land route.” 230 The military repeatedly retreated in the period of 
1999 to 2000, and there was no evidence that military challenged the civilian authority. 
Therefore, it illustrates that the military accepted Chandrika’s constitutional authority and 
objective control.  
This era highlights objective control and depicts how effectively she used 
incentives to subordinate senior commanders who had close links like General Daluwatte 
and ignored the corruption for subjective control in the same period. At the same time, 
she helped military education. The president and her team often kept the military 
commanders in dark. For example, three service commanders learned about the structural 
changes in NSC, when they were at a party with the secretary of defense.231 In 2000, 
Army Commander General Srilal Weerasooriya, who was responsible for severe military 
setbacks, was appointed as Pakistan High Commissioner to Sri Lanka. Frederica Jansz 
reported the Deputy Defense Minister Ratwatte’s corruption allegations regarding funds 
amounting to 41 million rupees—that “Amidst allegations that Anuruddha Ratwatte has 
long sought to ensure the war in Sri Lanka continues due to vested interests, three vaults 
in the names of Anuruddha, his wife Ramani, and her son Shivan Kanageeswaran were 
discovered at a private bank last week.”232 While it is true that President Chandrika 
maintained civilian control by offering incentives, she also helped the military to improve 
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its professionalism. The establishment of the Army Command and Staff College in 1998 
is an example.233 This is the highest joint military educational institution that prepares 
mid-level military officers and young civilian government officials for future command 
and staff duties. This eventually elevated objective control. Therefore, the executive 
command used a combination of heavy subjective and medium level objective control. 
D. REINFORCING CONTROL THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL 
COLLABORATION: INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISM: 1994-2005 
The interagency institutional guidance and control on military was undisputed in 
1994, but after 2002 political competition shaped CMR due to increases in executive and 
legislative branch contestation. In addition, lack of oversight provisions allowed the 
military autonomy, but it did not improve the influence of military in society or polity nor 
effectiveness.  In May 1999, the PA government institutionalized the ad-hoc NSC, 
formalized its command relationship with other services, and connected it with 
government agencies by a Gazette notification.234 The major structural change created a 
new Chief of Defense Staff appointment that was directly responsible to the president 
with regard to the three services. It was responsible for joint operations and coordination 
of counter-terrorist operations conducted by the three services and police.235 This new 
position took the command of three forces and the police. Athas notes:  
The armed forces and such officers of the police force as are engaged in 
anti-terrorist operations shall be under the command of the Chief of 
Defence Staff, Joint Operations and for this purpose, the Commander of 
the Army, the Commander of the Navy, the Commander of the Air Force 
and the Inspector General of Police shall act under his command.236  
However, this new structural change and position did not change the 
constitutional autonomy of the presidency. The president held the finance and defense 
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ministry portfolios, which created a predominant executive institutional mechanism for 
controlling the military, rather than allowing parliamentary or legislative control.  
In addition, the Sri Lankan democratic governance system lacked proper 
legislative mechanisms for overseeing the military. The level of the PA government’s 
corruption and fraud were higher than the previous government; as a result, the military 
corruption was not investigated. Bandarage notes, “Between US $80 million and US 
$120 million out of a government allocation of US $800 million for military equipment in 
early 2000 allegedly went to politicians and military officials as kickbacks.” 237 The 
reasoning behind less oversight of governmental processes was the elites’ belief that this 
would jeopardize the national security.238 Therefore, military autonomy or corruption 
was not challenged or curtailed by the institutional mechanism. For example, Jayadeva 
Uyangoda explains “Generally, parliamentary oversight on security expenditure and 
military policies has been quite weak in Sri Lanka.”239 This allowed the military to not 
challenge the status quo.  
During the 2001 general election, the military was used to intimidate opposition 
parties. Ratwatte was accused of using his personal protection platoon to kill 10 Muslim 
youths belonging to a rival political party.240 This illustrates the extent of politicization 
and lack of professionalism, which was the result of subjective control. However, the 
political competition in the 2001 general election challenged this institutional mechanism 
of president-centric control of the military. The ruling party, PA, lost the election, and the 
UNP leader became the new prime minister. This was a new experience in Sri Lankan 
political history, one in which the president and prime minister of rival political parties 
shared authority.  
The new era of the two parties in ruling institutions changed the CMR in two 
ways because this divided political setting led to professionalize the military. First, the 
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UNP tried to down size the military. Second, influenced by international peace lobby, 
Prime Minister Ranil Wickramasinghe’s government undermined military capabilities 
and service. The NGO peace lobby rallied around the new Prime Minister led United 
National Front (UNF). The UNF marginally won the election after receiving the support 
of minority parties such as the SLMC, Indian Tamil CWC, and the Indian Tamils’ Up-
Country Peoples Front (UCPF). The UNF also received Tamil National Alliance (TNA) 
support, which was considered the pro-LTTE political party.241 In this new divided 
political setting, the military remained subservient to civilian authority because the 
political parties’ competition to take control of military increased objective control, 
allowing the military to become more professionalized.   
The military followed the final authority command and stayed out of politics 
during competition for the defense ministry between the executive and legislative, which 
at that time was represented by two rival political parties. After the election, President 
Chandrika was reluctant to hand over the Ministry of Defense to her political rival, 
because according to the constitution the President was the commander-in-chief of armed 
forces.242 However, she handed over the MOD to the prime minister, and he appointed a 
new minister of defense. This created a contestation between defense policy-making and 
controlling the military. On the one hand, the prime minister tried to cripple the 
presidential power in defense policy-making in order to make the military more 
responsive to legislative control. The president retained the power of convening NSC and 
directing the military commanders. This political contestation did not affect CMR 
because among the military officers, party politics are identified to negatively impact 
their career progression. Therefore, objective control prevented military influences 
because the military deliberately wanted to stay neutral and avoid sided with any of the 
political parties.   
Later in 2002, the new government of Ranil signed a Cease Fire Agreement 
(CFA), which resulted in military humiliation and a CMR gap. The CFA was initiated by 
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the Norwegian peace brokers and the international community. To monitor this 
agreement, the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM) was established, which 
consisted of Scandinavian nationals. This agreement was not welcomed by the majority 
and was heavily criticized by the opposition because of the way in which the CFA 
signing was hidden from the public, legislature, and executive president.243 Some other 
reasons for criticisms were as follows: A) the negotiators offered equal status to the 
democratically elected government and internationally proscribed LTTE organization. B)  
the peace process weakening of  the military and it  strengthening of the LTTE. C) the 
negotiators did not raise the point to impose sanctions against the LTTE child soldiering 
and conscriptions. D) the Prime Minister has violated the PTA Act entering for terms 
with a terrorist outfit.244 These criticisms shaped the dynamics of the elite and the 
military and its impact was evident in the NSC. Jayadeva quotes a case study report: 
The meetings [NSC] were never held punctually and scheduled with short 
notice given, which made the prime minister an absentee due to his heavy 
schedules. No serious deliberation was made on CFA implementation at 
the NSC, but ad hoc criticisms were levelled giving an indication to the 
military authorities of the president’s apparent negative responsiveness 
and displeasure of the CFA.245     
This popular criticism shaped the military response because it was dissatisfied 
over the acceptance of two military forces in one country and the monitoring of Sri 
Lankan military’s actions by foreign nationals.246 This pushed the military into the 
President’s realm. Jayadeva notes, “the military was not overtly enthusiastic about the 
implementation of the CFA” because prior to the signing of the CFA, the Prime Minister 
had consulted with the Army and Navy chiefs, yet their concerns were neglected in 
formulating the CFA.  
Moreover, the CFA limited the freedom of movement of the military, but not the 
LTTE; the Norwegian funded program instructed the elites and the military to reduce the 
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High Security Zone (HSZ) and downsize the military. These moves were highly opposed 
by the military elite. For example, then Jaffna commander “Major General Sarath 
Fonseka said that the relaxation of the High Security Zones (HSZ) should be conditional 
on the disarming of the Tiger Cadres.”247 Furthermore, Bandula Jayasekara reiterated the 
generals comment note: 
In his de-escalation plan General Fonseka says that it should be borne in 
mind that when talking in terms of a political solution, political criticism 
in the South of Sri Lanka cannot be ignored, therefore any adjustment or 
variations in security zones should not create a political turmoil in the 
south and should be considered as critical.248  
However, the military remained subservient to the civilian institutional 
mechanism. As Jayadeva notes, “In its relations with the civilian political elite, Sri 
Lanka’s security sector appears to operate within a framework of professional norms.”249   
The Norwegian backed peace process helped Sri Lanka to take part in United 
Nations peacekeeping missions in 2004. Furthermore, this peace process created political 
turmoil in the south, and Norway’s role as a neutral mediator was in question. The 
Norwegian funded programs armed the LTTE and facilitated them in obtaining training 
from their special forces.250 The LTTE’s military build-up also created animosity for the 
CFA in the south. Bandarage notes, “Effiges of Norwegian facilitator Erik Solheim were 
burnt, and mass protests were organized by the Sinhalese and Tamil dissidents against 
what was seen as Norwegian favoritism towards the LTTE. One rally drew over 50,000 
people, considered to be the largest protest in Sri Lankan history.”251 As a result, in 
February 2004, President Chandrika used the constitutional power to retake the MOD and 
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two other ministries.252 This led to dissolution of parliament and call for 2004 general 
election.  
However, the military remained neutral during this political turmoil; the reasons 
could be a combination of the following: 1) the nurtured subjective control, like 
appointing retired loyal senior officers for the government institution’s higher positions, 
2) the nurtured objective control through personal and professional competition among 
the officers, which led to connecting those officers with both of the major political 
parties, 3) societal faith in the military, which prevented a breach of trust,253 4) that in 
April 2004, the new United Nations peacekeeping mission added the military into its 
mission, thereby not only elevating the military’s professionalism and recognition in the 
international arena but also creating economic incentives to the troops.   
E. REINFORCING CONTROL THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL 
COLLABORATION: EXECUTIVE COMMAND 2005-2009 AND END OF 
TERRORISM 
The new President Mahinda Rajapaksa, the head of the SLFP came in to power in 
2005. He had to build confidence and restructure the military to face semi-conventional 
capabilities of the LTTE. In the presidential election of 2005, the UNF’s leader Ranil lost 
to the SLFP leader Rajapaksa, who was backed by strong nationalist movements and the 
parties against the CFA. The peace process elevated the LTTE’s strategic position in the 
international system and paved the way to establish a de-facto administrative body, 
judicial system, police force, and separate military, naval, and air wings. Therefore, 
President Rajapaksa had to take a calculated risk while using military strategy because 
the military was in a demoralized state after repeated retreats and was ineffective due to 
previous government politicizations. During this era, the president formulated a national 
security strategy collaborating with political, military, economic, government, and media 
institutions. These branches were allowed extended autonomy to achieve a single national 
objective, which was to eliminate the LTTE.   
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The strong Sinhala nationalist and moderate Tamils demand for eliminating the 
LTTE shaped Rajapaksa’s executive command. His determination to end the conflict 
gave confidence to the military commanders. At the beginning of Rajapaksa’s tenure, the 
military had less faith in the president, but a strong nationalist movement encouraged the 
president to use force and, in turn, the military accepted the new political dimensions. 
Jayadeva notes, “In the context of the war against Tamil sectionalist rebel groups, ethnic 
and ideological factors have contributed to ensuring solidarity between the political and 
security elite.”254 The LTTE started the Elam War IV in April 2006. As a prelude, it 
killed the deputy army commander, attempted to kill the army commander General 
Fonseka using a suicide bomber, massacred Sinhala peasants in Kebithigollawa and 
closed Mavil Aru sluice gate, which was the lifeline of Sinhala and Muslim farmers 
cultivating in the east. President Rajapaksa decided to commence operations against the 
LTTE in 2006, and by 2008, made the SLMM and CFA null and void.  
The president used service chiefs to formulate the defense strategy along with his 
secretary of the MOD—his brother, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, a former lieutenant colonel. 
President Rajapaksa used a hands-off approach with regards to military affairs during the 
conflict. Don Wijewardana notes, “The president delegated the task of fighting the war to 
professionals, the team being led by Gotabaya Rajapaksa and service chiefs.”255 By 
appointing his brother as defense secretary, he continued the practice of subjective 
control, which entails family, caste, ethno-nationalism based CMR. The military 
commanders’ relationships with the Gotabaya were used to obtain civilian control. For 
example, VK Shashikumar reports, “He (Gotabaya) was embraced and accepted by the 
military and his was a legitimate voice in the Army,” said a senior official in the 
president’s office. “Gotabaya communicated the military requirements to the 
government—men, material and weapons.”256 This connection improved the cohesion 
among civilian elites and military.    
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The president allowed military further autonomy improving objective control, but 
at the same time, he used personal, professional, and service rivalry to maintain 
subjective control. The army commander was allowed to pick his own team and 
operational strategy. General Fonseka was a highly-esteemed military character; 
however, he did not respect other service commanders, especially to the navy commander 
Admiral Karnnagoda. The president and secretary of the MOD knew that General 
Fonseka was the best professional commander to eliminate the LTTE, but among the 
army officers he was not seen as a compassionate commander. According to D. B. S. 
Jeyaraj, “they admired him as a professional but disliked him at a personal level. But 
Fonseka was highly popular among the rank and file.”257 The navy invented a new 
asymmetrical tactical concept, Small Boat Operation, similar to the Small Infantry Team 
Operation (SIOT) invented by the Army. These innovative concepts were real game-
changers in land and sea domains. However, both General Fonseka and Admiral 
Karannagoda tried to compete and claim success in the battlegrounds based on their 
personal planning. D. B. S. Jeyaraj notes, “Fonseka and Karannagoda the navy chief were 
not on speaking terms. Relations were rather strained though not ruptured between Air 
Force Chief Gunatilleke and Fonseka.” 258 These service rivalries allowed the executive 
to retain civilian control over military because it increased the involvement of the 
secretary of MOD to coordinate the joint military strategy. Jeyaraj reports, “He 
[Gotabaya] liaised between the Army and navy and Army and Air Force. He smoothed 
ruffled feelings and secured the cooperation of all.”259 As a result, during the conflict, the 
executive command was unchallenged due to established subjective control from rivalry 
and improved objective control.  
In addition, the president’s executive command used a holistic approach that 
paved the way to ending the conflict in 2009. When examining the failure of previous 
president’s, the following factors prevented their success: lack of coordination in joint 
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operations, absence of a secretary of the MOD to obtain the trust of the military, lack of 
confidence in the military, and fear of military coup, which prevented military 
autonomy.260 Rajapaksa’s military strategy rectified these issues as follows: A) 
President’s hands-off approach and military autonomy B) managing service rivalry and 
selecting the right personnel in other bureaucratic institutions like in the MOD, foreign 
affairs, and national media).C).Unifying  those institutions to focus on the war effort. D) 
Maintaining uninterrupted military hardware supply and winning India’s concern E). 
Restricting media and NGO activities that targeted the military and protecting the 
military from domestic and international pressure.261  
This holistic approach improved the military commanders’ confidence and 
elevated civilian supremacy in controlling the military, illustrating a combination of 
subjective and objective CMR models. According to new conceptualization model, 
usually when the military is engaged in counter-terrorism roles, the level of democratic 
control is high in institutional control mechanisms, oversight, and professional norms. 
Interestingly, in this case, direct institutional executive control was visibly low because of 
the president’s hands-off approach but through subjective control it maintained a high 
status of control over the military. Executive command employed its agents to scrutinize 
military activities. Therefore, the president was able to ascertain the command while 
maintaining a professional, effective military.  
F. REINFORCING CONTROL THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL 
COLLABORATION: INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISM 2005-2009 AND 
END OF TERRORISM 
During this era, the interagency institutional guidance and control on military was 
well-coordinated among the executive office and other institutions. The increased 
executive and legislative branch cooperation contributed to military success. The NSC 
formulated clear objectives in its defense strategy, including roles and missions. To 
defeat the LTTE, it expanded military manpower to launch attrition warfare, exploited the 
LTTE’s dependence on sea lines of communication in supplying military hardware, 
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intercepted the LTTE sea tiger movements, restructured the military, and equipped the 
miltary to meet the objective.262 Moreover, it created a media center for national security 
to manage public information and report the battle situation to others.263 In turn, this 
center limited the access of adverse domestic and international media groups to battle 
front information, thereby restricting the LTTE’s propaganda mechanism and 
maintaining the morale of military and society. Essentially, these developments led to 
improved military effectiveness in terms of plans, structures, and resources, yet oversight 
arrangements and mechanisms remained weak.   
The restructuring of the military took place while the conflict was ongoing. Some 
of the changes were internal, such as promoting battle-hardened corporals and sergeants 
as commissioned officers to the rank of second lieutenant. This filled the shortages of 
small team commanders who were required to operate the SIOT behind the enemy lines 
as well as provide support to mission command. The army lacked the men and materials 
to engage in protracted insurgency.264 However, during 2006-2009, the legislature 
approved the military demands because of the successful war against the LTTE. The 
MOD budget allocation was at average 3.35 percentage of country’s GDP.265 As a result, 
military strength rose by 85,000. This helped to meet the shortages of manpower and 
material. For example, Sergei De Silva-Ranasinghe notes, “New offensive formations 
were raised—the 57th division in February 2007; the 58th division (initially known as 
Task Force 1) in September 2007; the 59th division in January 2008; Task Force 2 in 
November 2007; Task Force 3 in November 2008; and Task Force 4 in December 
2008.”266 
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In addition, the military and the MOD supported professional development for the 
military which strengthened CMR. In 1997, the military had established a directorate for 
the training of men in International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Human Rights (HR).267 
The military had 24 institutional facilities to provide professional training.268 These 
centers, along with the training establishment under the MOD, such as the Defense 
Services Command and the Staff College (DSCSC) and Kothalawela Defense University 
(KDU), made contributions which enhanced the professionalism of the military officers, 
especially in terms of expertise and ethics. Furthermore, many officers were regularly 
sent for overseas training.269 These established institutional mechanisms with regard to 
professionalizing the military contributing to the achievement of objective control, such 
as obeying for civilian rulers and the military is abide by laws to following civilian rulers 
command regardless of personnel political ideologies.  
However, legislative and non-governmental institutional control was weak in the 
areas of oversight. The constitutional power of the president shaped the public service 
mechanism. Chandrasena Maliyadde notes, “The public service was created in Sri Lanka 
to cater to the needs of the “Master”. Serious and unprecedented changes are taking place 
outside the public service and the country at an accelerated pace. The public service 
changes at a snail’s pace and continue serving the “Master” at the expense of the very 
public.”270 The participatory politics in the society was high, but its involvement in 
security sector affairs manifested itself along the lines of ethno-nationalism and majority 
concern. Furthermore, the military depended more heavily on the executive branch than 
the legislative branch. For example, the many demands of military were met along 
informal channels; Wijewardana notes, “Gotabaya communicated the military 
requirements to the government—men, material, and weapons. His brother and head of 
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the government, President Rajapaksa, ensured the military got what it wanted.”271 The 
President held the finance minister’s portfolio and to pass the defense budget in 
parliament, his party had less than a majority, 105 of 225 seats in 2004-2007. But in 
2007, he managed to win 18 opposition members of the parliament of the UNP and 
consolidated the majority approval for budgets.272 Therefore, legislative and other 
institutional mechanisms in control were clearly dominated  by the executive branch, but 
it proved to be successful in helping end LTTE terrorism.  
G. POST-CONFLICT CHALLENGE 2009-2015: TRANSITIONING THE 
MILITARY TO NATION-BUILDING  
Having won the conflict against the Tamil insurgency in 2009, the government 
and military’s popularity shaped their relations. Interestingly, the military popularity 
aggravated subjective control fearing military takeover. However, reconstruction, 
rehabilitation, reconciliation, and economic challenges created a shift in military roles. 
President Rajapaksa called for an early presidential election in January 2010 hoping to 
capitalize on the victory to get reelected.273 While the president claimed credit for victory 
over the LTTE and for bringing peace, the former army commander General Fonseka 
claimed that the victory belonged to him, and he presented himself as an opposition 
candidate. Then retired General Fonseka was backed by the UNP, JVP, and other 
segments in the society. The growing popularity of the military made General Fonseka 
ambitious. Jeyaraj notes “On ‘spirited’ occasions the General fires off like a loose 
cannon. Fonseka began talking of himself as the man who defeated the Tamils like the 
son of Ruhunu and began querying from friends and acquaintances in bantering tones 
‘Why can’t I be the next president?”’274 To illustrate this growing tension in the CMR, 
the General wanted to raise the military strength to 300,000 and projected the deployment 
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of 100,000 in the north. There were also instances when he challenged the President’s 
executive command, as Jeyaraj reports: 
 
An address to the nation was scheduled by the president for the morning 
of May 19th to announce the tiger supremo’s death. But to Mahinda’s 
chagrin Fonseka refused to confirm the death and the president’s 
anticipated announcement did not materialise. But after the presidential 
address was concluded the Army chief announced to the nation that 
Prabhakaran had been killed. Sarath Fonseka and not Mahinda Rajapaksa 
made the historic announcement. 275  
However, the subjective control of military helped President Rajapaksa to survive 
this power challenge. His brother, the Secretary of Defense, made use of his military 
friendships with other military elites mitigating the powers of the General. Moreover, the 
General was overly confident and accused the politicians of corruption. Realizing the 
growing threat to civilian supremacy, he was relieved from the commander of army 
position.276 His nominated successor, General Jayasuriya, who was penalized and 
harassed by General Fonseka, was hand-picked as the commander of the army. This 
compelled General Fonseka to retire and declare candidacy, and the military elites were 
pushed into a state of disarray.  
The military remained loyal to civilian leadership for various reasons: the 
majority of the officers accepted General Fonseka as a great warrior and one of the most 
successful military commanders in history, but they disliked his personal attitude.277 The 
state also engaged in field promotions and incentives to senior officers, like postings in 
diplomatic missions. There was also growing uncertainty of election outcome, and the 
fact that many officers had direct connections to the secretary of MOD kept them on the 
side-lines. In addition, the Api Wenuwen Api welfare program supported the disabled 
and active personnel to ease their economic hardships. These improved the CMR and 
helped civilian leaders to maintain subjective control.  
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President Rajapaksa won the election and the military was brought under heavy 
subjective control. The officers closely linked to General Fonseka were forced into 
compulsory retirement, and some were sidelined. The NDTV reported, “Sri Lanka on 
Monday sacked 12 senior military officers for being a ‘threat to national security’ and 
hatching ‘political conspiracy’ during the just-concluded presidential polls.”278 Later, 
General Fonseka was accused of violations of military acts and jailed. Ranil Wijepala 
notes: 
His [Retired General Fonseka] defeat at the 2010 presidential election 
gave the Mahinda Rajapaksa regime ample room to seek vengeance 
against him and rip him of his titles, his military ranks, decorations and 
convert him to a civilian sans any of the credentials he earned and 
deprived him of even his civic rights and sent him to jail.279  
The senior officers who played a significant role in the conflict and those who 
remained loyal to the President were offered lucrative positions in diplomatic missions 
and government civil administrative sectors.280 
The next challenges were to rebuild the economy, resettle Internally Displace 
persons (IDP), reconstruct, and rehabilitate ex-LTTE carders and reconcile with the 
marginalized population. The military played an important role in this. The government 
used military agents and their expertise knowledge in all these arenas  Since 2000, the Sri 
Lankan governments have managed to maintain a constant economic growth. The U.S. 
Department of State reports, “Despite the 1983-2009 civil war GDP growth averaged 
around 5% from 2000-2008.”281 Sri Lanka’s economic growth fell to 3.5% GDP due to 
the global economic crisis in 2009. The western countries also influenced the donor 
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countries and pressured monetary institutions to ignore Sri Lanka’s demands. 
Wijewardana notes, “Hillary Clinton, his [Obama’s] secretary of state, took the unusual 
step of demanding the IMF, an independent UN institution, not to release a loan of US 
$1.9 billion it had already agreed to give Sri Lanka, claiming ‘the timing was 
inappropriate to provide the money.”’282  
These forms of pressure were well-managed by the government, which utilized 
the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) power play. China, Japan, India, and Pakistan came to 
help Sri Lanka. China, especially, helped with the Hambanthota port development project 
worth US $1 billion, the Norchcohalai coal power plant worth US $855 million, the 
Colombo-Katunayake highway worth US $248.2 million. These projects helped Sri 
Lanka to manage its economy. Other sources also helped, according to the U.S. state 
department: 
Remittances from migrant workers, at around US $6 billion per year, are 
Sri Lanka’s largest source of foreign exchange and helped to partially 
offset the trade deficit. Sri Lanka also receives multilateral and bilateral 
financial support. While China has emerged as the largest recent lender, 
traditional donors such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, 
Asian Development Bank (ADB), and Japan as well as neighboring India 
continue to provide significant funds.283  
As a result, the military was able to increase its professionalism standards.  
The majority of government expenditure was the military budget. Historically, it 
had been proven that military jobs were the major income source of many rural 
youths.284 At the end of the conflict, the military strength rose to 375,000. This defense 
sector job opportunity attracted rural youths by offering many fringe benefits. For 
example, initially, the Api Wenuwen Api welfare program project aimed to provide 
50,000 houses to Tri-service personnel.285 It offered a house worth 0.9 million rupees 
free of charge to the soldiers. To construct these houses, the military provided the labor. 
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The Media Centre for National Security Director General Lakshman Hulugalle spelled 
out the first phase of this project: “Seven hundred houses will be constructed throughout 
the country for Security Forces personnel under the Api Wenuwen Api housing 
program.”286 These projects elevated the confidence and allegiance of the military 
towards the civilian government.  
However, many scholars, like Muttukrishna Sarvananthan, argue that maintaining 
such a large military is a burden for the economy of Sri Lanka; Sarvananthan says, 
“Moreover, every member of the armed forces (including the police), on average, costs 
the exchequer $4,348 (LKR 478,266) per year, which is significantly higher than the 
average cost of any other public sector personnel.”287 However, he failed to recognize the 
effective use of the military in resettlement of IDPs, reconstruction, rehabilitation of ex-
LTTE carders, and reconciliation. According to the MOD, in 2009, soon after the 
conflict, there were 300,000 IDPs.288 After six years, these figures came down to 13,459 
families that accounted for 44,000 IDPs.289 These resettlement projects demanded skilled 
labor to build houses, schools, and other community related infrastructure. The military 
deployed in the north and eastern region had more resources than any other public or 
private sector to support this humanitarian effort. The Sri Lankan Army Humanitarian 
Demining Unit (SLA & HDU), along with another six agencies, carried out a national 
demining action plan to free the lands to civilians, in addition to the military supported 
housing projects. The international Reliefweb reports, “The Sri Lankan Army has 
provided 1,230 displaced families in Jaffna with houses at an approximate cost of Rs. 250 
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million.” 290 Similarly, other regional military establishments created housing for IDPs. 
The Ministry Of Resettlement, Reconstruction and Hindu Religious Affairs notes: 
Under this relocation project [in Mullaithiv], houses for 165 families will 
be constructed in two stages. Apart from houses, 05 common Dug wells, 
10 Tube wells, 165 Toilets, a Community Centre, a Pre School, 10 Km of 
Internal roads will also be constructed at a total of Rs. 111.5 Mn. The Sri 
Lanka Army in Mullaitivu is in the forefront in constructing these houses 
and other amenities 291  
In addition, rehabilitation of ex-LTTE cadres was another challenge. The military 
provided the vocational training and technical support to reintegrate these individuals. 
These efforts were carried out in association with government, private, and 
nongovernmental organizations. This was a joint effort of military and government. For 
example, the rehabilitation commissioner general was a senior military officer. By 
October 2014, the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Prison Reforms had reintegrated 12,016 
former LTTE cadres.292 Accordingly, to contribute to the success of reconciliation, the 
military recruited some of these cadres. The MOD reports, “A large number of these 
youths were recruited to the Civil Defense Department. As a trust building initiative, 
youth from the North and East were recruited to the Police. Recently 100 Tamil females 
from Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu joined the Army.”293 
The civilian leaders used heavy subjective control mechanisms to control the 
military and, as a consequence, it helped to increase the objective control because the 
divided political setting prevented the military agents’ allegiance to one civilian group. 
Therefore, the military accepted the constitutional authority vested on executive 
presidency and its command illustrating professionalism norms. The civilian leadership 
in power utilized constitutional authority to minimize the legislative control mechanisms 
                                                 
290  “Army Build Houses for IDPs,” Reliefweb, accessed October 23, 2015, http://reliefweb.int/report/
sri-lanka/army-build-houses-idps. 
291 Sri Lanka Ministry of Resettlement, Reconstruction, and Hindu Religious Affairs, “Kepapilavu 
Relocation Programme,” accessed February 23, 2015, http://resettlementmin.gov.lk/site/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=29&Itemid=26&lang=en. 
292 Sri Lanka Ministry of Defense, “Rehabilitation,” http://www.defence.lk/rehabilitation/
rehabilitation.asp. 
293 Sri Lanka Ministry of Defense, “Rising from the Ashes: Post War Development of Sri Lanka,” 
http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=Post_War_Development_of_Sri_Lanka_20130210_05.   
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involved in controlling the military. Furthermore, they used this authority to politicize 
military agents together with other subjective control mechanisms like appointing 
generals close to party politics into higher command positions. In each of these instances, 
the other military agents did not engage in party politics because they understood the 
consequence for their military careers at divided political settings. On the other hand, the 
intensity of the LTTE conflict compelled civilian leaders to equip and professionalize the 
military. As a result, the increased budgets and training facilities increased the military 
professionalism. Accordingly, increased subjective nature of control prevented total 
military politicization, and instead increased professionalism.  
Moreover, after end of the conflict, the civilian leaders changed the role of the 
military from a firefighter counter insurgency force to a firefighter national development 
force. This new role increased the military involvement across the country, but civilian 
leaders’ subjective control along with institutional mechanisms controlled its effect 
because the military carried out nation-building projects under the supervision of the 
MOD. Therefore, it prevented military prerogatives securing civilian supremacy. 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
How does the civilian leadership in Sri Lanka maintain control of its military 
effectively? This chapter analyzes the applicability of Huntington, Alagappa, and 
Bruneau and Matei’s CMR models to Sri Lanka during its three-decade insurgency and 
post-conflict era. For the purpose of this evaluation, civilian leadership eras are sectioned 
into nine different time periods and each of the CMR models are analyzed during these 
periods and given weight: heavy (H), medium (M), low (L), and no evidence (N). While 
all three models are applicable, the result is unique because while subjective control is 
high in Sri Lanka, it surprisingly resulted in professionalizing the military. In other 
words, this analysis highlights the fact that while the military was primarily controlled 
through subjective mechanisms, the divided political setting aided in professionalizing 
the military.  
In the CMR model evaluation, Table 3 depicts the level of applicability of the 
theoretical model of Huntington’s subjective and objective control and Alagappa’s state 
coercion theoretical model. Table 4 depicts Bruneau and Matei’s new conceptualization 
framework.  
Table 3.   CMR Model Evaluation 
 
Time Frame and Major Events 
Huntington’s Model Alagappa’s Model  
Subjective Objective State Coercion  
1948–1956 (Post-Independence) M M N 
1956–1962 (Attempted Coup) H L L 
1962–1971 (JVP Insurgency) H L H 
1971–1978 (Emergence of Tamil 
Militancy) 
H L M 
1978–1989 (Emergence of LTTE) H M H 
1989–1994 (LTTE and JVP) H M H 
1994–2005 (Peace –Talks)  H M M 
2005–2009 (End of Conflict) M H M 
2009–Post-Conflict Era H H N 
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Table 4.   CMR Model Evaluation 
Time Frame and 
Major Events 
New Conceptualization 





L L L L 
1956–1962 
(Attempted Coup) 
L L L L 
1962–1971 (JVP 
Insurgency) 








M L M M 
1989–1994 (LTTE 
and JVP) 
H L M M 
1994–2005 (Peace-
Talks) 
L L M L 
2005–2009 (End of 
Conflict) 
H M H H 
2009–Post Conflict 
Era  
H M H H 
 
A. 1948- 1956: POST-INDEPENDENCE 
During 1948–1956, Alagappa’s state coercion and Bruneau and Matei’s new 
conceptualization models have little relevance for CMR in Sri Lanka because the state 
was new, and it carried on the British administration and practices. During this time, it is 
evident that a balance of subjective and objective control prevailed. The military was in 
its organizational phase after the 1948 independence and at the same time, the elites’ 
class interests were merged with military agents because colonial legacies and ethnic 
representations favored English-educated elites. The ethnic representation in the military 
did not favor the major ethnic group, Sinhala Buddhists, because they were marginalized 
during British rule. As a result, military and society were divide ethnically. Therefore, the 
officer corps who worked under the British rulers’ favored a similar political setting and 
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elite culture that contributed to subjective control. The British military professional ethics 
influences also helped to maintain relative objective control.  
Towards the end of the first phase, the political structures aligned along ethno- 
nationalism lines and changed recruitment patterns. When the Sinhala Buddhist 
representation increased in the military, Huntington’s model of subjective control gained 
momentum. The military professionalization, which is a part of objective control, 
discussed in the same model, was not developed to undertake a full spectrum of 
operational tasks. At the same time, the relative conditions of peace that existed promoted 
a ceremonial military rather than an effective military to protect national security; 
therefore, the civilian leadership sidelined the importance of allocating resources to the 
military.  
B. 1956–1962: ATTEMPTED COUP  
As the new nation-state formation was ongoing during 1956–1962, ethno-
nationalism ideologies, kinships and class interests blended into subjective control. The 
ethno-nationalist ideology changed the military recruitment pattern and increased the 
civilian leaders’ ability to easily politicize the military. Those actions distorted the 
professional norms and the effectiveness of the military, which led to an unsuccessful 
coup in 1962. By then civilian leadership had begun to rely on a high degree of subjective 
control. As Huntington noted, when the military represents a particular class or group and 
the same civilian group gains control over the military, it becomes politicized.294 
Similarly, the SLFP leaders consolidated their power over the military using the loyalty 
                                                 
294 In subjective civilian control, civilian groups with various interests compete with each other to gain 
superior control over the military. In this discussion, power maximization of one or more civilian group is 
relative to other civilian groups at the national level. Control of the military is achieved through 
governmental institutions, social classes, and constitutional forms. At the government institution level, the 
President and members of the legislature compete with each other on decisions about the military. This 
allows these competing groups to politicize the military. Moreover, when no professional military officer 
corps is present, then the subjective civilian control is evident in the governing systems. (Huntington, The 
Solider and State, 80–83). 
Next, Huntington notes that objective civilian control allows for autonomy and supports the military to 
maximize its own professionalism. The main idea is to keep the military away from politics while 
recognizing its autonomous state in deciding military affairs; however, it remains under government 
civilian control. Huntington expected that this objective could be achieved naturally. He stated that once the 
military becomes more professionalized, then it can remain neutral in political alignments. (Huntington, 
The Solider and State, 83–85).  
86 
of the majority Sinhala Buddhist officers. Therefore, the increased ethno-nationalism 
based on political competition allowed the subjective control mechanism to consolidate 
beyond Alagappa’s state coercion model and Bruneau and Matei’s new conceptualization 
framework. In addition, as result of this attempted coup in January 1962, the military 
was not able to increase its professionalism. Therefore, Table 3 shows that objective 
control is low but this coup attempt was the military’s first test of officer corps’ 
corporate interest. However, it indicates a divided officer corps as a result of the level 
of subjective control. 
While the subjective control mechanism helped to maintain civilian supremacy, 
the government faced unrest in the country as a consequence of the Sinhala Only Act that 
threatened to marginalize the Tamils and the closed economic policy. Then the SLFP 
government had to rely on state coercion; therefore, evidence of Alagappa’s state 
coercion model’s impact was low. At the same time, other government or NGO 
institutions were not developed enough to provide institutional control and oversight. 
Therefore, Alagappa’s state coercion and Bruneau and Matei’s new conceptualization 
models had little relevance during this era. However, Alagappa indicates that subjective 
control means are used in the CMR of South Asian countries, which is true in the Sri 
Lankan case.295 
C. 1962–1971: JVP INSURGENCY 
Table 3 highlights the continuation of the heavy influence of Huntington’s 
subjective control, leaving objective control at low point during 1962–1971. Huntington’s 
theory of low military professionalism applies here because governmental fears of 
another coup prevented further investment in the military. The class interests and ethno-
nationalism combined with subjective control suffocated objective control. Therefore, 
military subordination was achieved through high subjective control.  
In the same period, JVP emerged as a radical anti-state organization leading to the 
expansion of state coercion. This is because, according to Alagappa’s state coercion 
model, during internal conflicts the military becomes a political instrument and the 
295 Alagappa, Coercion and Governance, 9. 
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influence of the military increases. However, during this period, the military did not 
engage in protracted conflict. Therefore, at high levels of state coercion, the civilian 
leaders retained military control subjectively. 
Table 4 indicates that during 1962–1971, there was mid-level institutional 
control and oversight was at a low level. The first institutional mechanism used to control 
and guide the military arose during the 1971 JVP insurrection. According to Bruneau and 
Matei’s framework, institutional mechanisms become laws and regulations, which the 
military directly enacts through institutions like MOD. In 1971, the civilian leaders 
enacted an emergency law, which helped the military to crush the insurrection in a short 
period of time, but it led to some human rights abuses. This occurred as a result of 
ignoring professional standards. In addition, fearing another coup attempt, the civilians 
prevented collective military training. As a result, Table 4 indicates a low 
professionalism norm, according to Huntington’s theory of subjective control—which 
forms along political and class interests. This shapes the analysis in addition to Bruneau 
and Matei’s framework. At the same time, subjective control inhibited military 
autonomy, as discussed in Huntington’s model, which is needed for increased 
professionalism. The civilian leaders effectively used the military to crush the 1971 JVP 
insurgency, thus illustrating the effectiveness of subjective control and, in turn, 
influencing the medium level of effectiveness highlighted in Table 4. This indicates the 
interconnectedness and combined applicability of these three models. But it also 
highlights the continued domination of subjective control. 
In applying Matei’s model of institutionalism to this period, professionalism and 
effectiveness were low, but the subjective nature of civilian control increased the 
effectiveness of the military, particularly in this case. Therefore, research indicates that 
this framework’s applicability will depend on the intensity level of the insurgency. As 
discussed in this framework, the democratically elected civilian leadership creates 
policies and regulations for recruitment, education, and training for military personnel; 
however, during the JVP insurrection those factors were at low levels. Sri Lanka’s case 
shows that subjective control can increase the effectiveness of the military, which is also 
linked to its level of professionalism.  
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D. 1971–1978: EMERGENCE OF TAMIL MILITANCY 
During 1971–1978, Huntington’s subjective control model has a high 
applicability at the emergence of Tamil militancy because the change of recruitment 
patterns increased Sinhala youths’ participation in the military. As a result, military 
agents were subject to the popular political ideology of ethno-nationalism. On the other 
hand, since the 1962 coup attempt, the military was not allowed to assemble for 
collective training and restructuring. During the same period, 1971–1978, due to Tamil 
radicalization, state coercion (as described in Alagappa’s theory) gradually emerged 
engulfing the administration in northern areas, increasing military authority. The military 
became a political tool than a state tool. The Tamils living in the northern region saw the 
military as a politically biased coercion instrument of the government. Its impact was 
confined to one region; therefore, state coercion was at medium level. According to the 
new conceptualization framework, despite the informal NSC meetings since 1970, the 
institutional mechanism was at medium level, with high subjective control. The 
politicization of the military was evidenced by the lessening of its level of 
professionalism and by its medium level effectiveness. This occurred because the 
government invested less in its defense budget and the military was assigned police tasks 
rather than those of national defense. The oversight mechanism was also low, because it 
was limited by budgetary debate and played no part in managing the military. However, 
the subjective control model dominated. At the same time, ongoing insurgencies 
compelled civilians to invest in the military, thereby elevating the potential for 
professionalism.  
E. 1978–1989: EMERGENCE OF LTTE 
The combination of a new constitution in 1978, an open economic policy, the 
emergence of the LTTE, and the second JVP insurgency increased the subjective control 
and domination of the civilians during 1978–1989. The constitutional changes created an 
executive presidency lessening legislative control. As a result, the President consolidated 
subjective control, and, eventually, this control became predominant as the misuse of this 
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constitutional authority negated the control of the legislative branch and other oversight 
agencies.  
In addition, the military provided job opportunities to rural Sinhala youth. This 
also helped to increase subjective control as they were politicized. This illustrates an 
incentive-based subjective control, but interestingly and contrary to expectations, Sri 
Lankan experience provides new evidence of how insurgency movements compelled the 
government to increase military budgets and increased objective control and military 
professionalism. In 1978–1989, the military had to be trained for counter-insurgency 
operations; therefore, the civilian leaders increased the budget and provided foreign 
and local training opportunities to elevate objective control. Table 3 illustrates an 
increase of levels from low to medium and medium to high respectively of objective 
control and state coercion. In Table 4, the new conceptualization model illustrates 
institutionalism at medium level, because the PTA act provided guidance along with 
the MOD institutional guidance for the military in managing violence. However, 
the lack of oversight mechanisms caused unrecognized abuses under the PTA act; 
therefore, no improvement can be seen in the oversight spheres. But professionalism 
was at medium level because high subjective control prevented military autonomy. As 
a result, effectiveness was also at medium level. Furthermore, during 1978–1989, the 
PTA act also contributed to state coercion model influences, which increased coercion 
as indicated in Table 3. However, the regionalization of state coercion limited the 
military’s influence to the northern and eastern regions. Therefore, a high level of 
subjective control indicates that it can alter the influence of the other models differently 
while still supporting military professionalism.  
F. 1989–1994: LTTE AND JVP 
The divided political climate and the LTTE conflict helped to maintain the 
military’s professionalism and objective control. During 1989–1994, the high level of 
division in the two main political parties led to the impeachment of the president for his 
controversial arming of the LTTE to fight the IPKF. The military officers distanced 
themselves from the political competition because they knew that temporary affiliations 
to party politics would negatively impact their military careers since the president’s 
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constitutionally-given power to remove senior commanders maintaining high subjective 
control. Furthermore, President Premadasa traded those allegations for popular anti-
Indian sentiments in the public eye, so the military did not want to oppose him in fear of 
being anti-national. However, in 1991 President Premadasa ordered security forces in the 
east to surrender to the LTTE. But the military refused and its professional actions saved 
many lives. In this instance, this military act did not affect the CMR, but allowed the 
president to rectify his mistakes, and, in turn, he had to provide the military with 
necessities to conduct war. Therefore, this unique situation offers an example of how 
subjective control did not have negative ramifications, but instead it helped to increase 
objective control and professionalism.  
In Table 3, Alagappa’s state coercion model’s influence is high because the 
second JVP insurgency and the LTTE conflict increased military influence, and yet 
the regional aspect of conflict prevented the expansion of military influences. Also 
improved military professionalism prevented the military from interfering in politics.  
Table 4 indicates that institutional control increased to a high level because the 
executive branch consolidated its power during the failed impeachment attempt. Then the 
increased defense budget and training for military supported the development of the 
military’s professionalism, increasing it to a medium level. However, the military’s 
autonomy was limited by the MOD-approved regulations for promotions, recruitment, 
and retention. The military’s effectiveness was at a medium level, because the 
government failed to create a sustainable military strategy. Therefore, the applicability of 
Matei’s framework did not increase compared to Huntington’s subjective control 
in Table 4, yet it does indicate the influence of subjective control, as in Matei’s 
framework. The president’s constitutional authority became subjective, and it 
suffocated oversight and professional norms.  
G. 1994–2005: PEACE TALKS 
During the peace talks era from 1994–2005, the military suffered heavy setbacks 
resulting from extreme subjective control. As a consequence of those setbacks, the 
LTTE’s dominance increased and this compelled President Chandrika’s government to 
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increase the military budget and incentives to maintain subjective control. This, in turn, 
increased the professionalization of the military. On the other hand, a divided political 
climate which existed between the executive and legislative branches influenced CMR, 
but the military remained loyal to constitutional authority, thus illustrating a 
medium level of objective control (see Table 3).  
According to the new conceptualization model, weak NSC functions dropped 
institutional influences from medium to low because President Chandrika politicized the 
military and negated the MOD functions. A notable medium level of professional 
norms and low effectiveness were highlighted in Table 4 because, in spite of an 
increased budget, the military suffered heavy losses, lowering its effectiveness from 
medium to low. However, the military remained subject to civilian command. 
Therefore, even though effectiveness levels dropped, see Table 4, Huntington’s 
objective control absorbed the impact of those effects, maintaining the medium 
level in Table 3. Consequently, elevated subjective control predominated in the 
other CMR models. However, the SLFP president and the competition of the Prime 
Minister from the rival political party impacted the military agents’ response and, in 
turn, it helped to elevate objective control.  
H. 2005–2009: END OF CONFLICT 
The years 2005–2009 marked the fall of the LTTE and the end of the conflict. The 
success of CMR was nominal with medium subjective control and high objective control 
allowing military autonomy. President Mahinda Rajapaksa managed to retain subjective 
control with a nominally low profile. But through Gotabaya Rajapaksa, his brother, and 
the secretary of the MOD, he maintained a hidden high subjective control until the 
conflict ended. In addition, the president and civilian leaders managed the service rivalry 
and used it to achieve subjective control. Nevertheless, this era illustrated a high level of 
institutional mechanism coordinated through the MOD. The military gained more 
resources and support from the institutional mechanism to invest in military education. It 
increased military professionalism. In addition, this was a byproduct of the LTTE conflict 
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because the level of conflict forced the government to invest in military education, which 
resulted in high objective control.     
The state coercion was also high due to military operations in the northern and 
eastern regions. However, the military’s influence was less in the general polity and 
society because it was regionally limited. The budget and increased strength of the 
military allowed it to become a predominant government institution. This helped the 
military to shift its role from a counter-insurgency force to nation-building force. 
Therefore, by the end of the conflict, when the civilian leaders demanded military 
engagement in post-conflict development projects, its resources and expertise were 
allocated to meet the demand. Therefore, this unique case illustrates that subjective 
control can also lead to high objective control with an increased level of professionalism.  
Interestingly, during 2005–2009, according to Table 4, professional norms and 
effectiveness rose to the highest levels, because the MOD and military institutions 
launched training programs, which increased professionalism and finally created an 
effective military. The constitution continued to limit the legislative oversight 
mechanism. However, a strong executive presidency and institutional mechanism helped 
to control non-government oversight agencies, like INGOs and media, which were 
paramount in supporting the end of the thirty-year-long conflict. If such restrictions had 
not been imposed, efforts may not have been successful. Therefore, this unique case 
challenges the applicability of new conceptualization models’ oversight through INGOs, 
NGOs, and the media. As a result, countries should adopt democratic values into warfare 
strategies, but they should not hinder national objectives and military strategy; therefore, 
depending on the stability of political leadership (in developing and consolidated 
democracies), popular demand, social standard, and economic strengths can dictate the 
terms of democratic control. 
I. 2009: TO POST-CONFLICT ERA 
Table 3 illustrates a high subjective level of control for the period from 2009 to 
the present that led to professionalization of the military in a divided political climate. 
After the conflict, civilian leader and former commander of the army, General Fonseka 
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contested each presidency in 2010. As a result of the general’s political actions, the 
military establishment was taken under heavy subjective civilian control. The punishment 
and incentives contributed to subjective control. The senior officers affiliated with 
General Fonseka were relieved of their duties and officers loyal to President Rajapaksa 
were promoted. The other officers remained neutral because the subjective control and 
divided political climate contributed unintentional objective control and increased 
professional behavior within the officer corps.  
On the other hand, the government increased foreign training and infrastructure 
facilities to create the highest level of professional standards, which contributed to 
objective control and kept the military away from politics. In this unique situation, 
subjective and objective control were both equally high because when civilian leaders 
initiate subjective control, it increases both professionalism and objective control to 
similar levels.  
According to Bruneau and Matei’s new conceptualization framework, 
institutionalism was at a high level because the MOD connected other government 
agencies and managed procedural regulations. The MOD provided close supervision and 
monitored military promotions, foreign training courses, budget allocations, and 
procurement of military hardware. This established a balance between civilian control 
and military autonomy in decision making. The MOD set the objectives, role, and 
missions for the military. The use of military nation-building projects was criticized by 
many and there were allegations of militarization of the country. Some argued that 
military was not making the best use of its potential. However, the military has taken part 
in peacekeeping operations since 2004, which also increased professionalism and 
democratic values. The military has not lost its operational readiness because it has two 
strategic reserve divisions and a standby brigade for UN peacekeeping operations.    
In addition, in this case, the military’s involvement in rehabilitation, 
reconstruction, and reconciliation projects did not negatively affect or derail democratic 
civilian control. Instead, it increased military objective control because it became a state 
tool for reconstruction, not a political one. According to Alagappa, this could be 
described as a state coercion instrument, but this unique case proves that during peace 
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times, it can be used as a state tool. In other words, Sri Lanka’s case study uniquely 
establishes interconnectedness across the three CMR models.  
Bruneau points to other scholars’ disagreements on Huntington’s military 
professionalism, indicating that military professionalism—much like culture—cannot be 
measured as a stable component because it is subject to frequent change.296 In this 
context, it is connected with the divided political system because regardless of 
Huntington’s professionalism, the Sri Lankan military experienced repercussions in being 
affiliated with political parties. Furthermore, the service rivalry and peer competition 
amongst officers shows that it will never unify officer corps to overthrow civilian 
government. In other words, officers in Sri Lanka cannot develop a corporate interest to 
stage a coup. Therefore, the military will be separate from politics in the future.  
Bruneau and Matei’s framework illustrates that professionalism is a legally-
backed policy and regulatory mechanism involved in deciding military size, training, 
and promotions. Table 4 shows that it is at the highest level currently because the 
military does not have sole authority to decide its recruitment, retention, 
promotions, and retirement. The government administrative policies and financial 
regulations dictate the size of the military and promotions, which involve budget 
allocations. Therefore, in terms of new conceptualization frameworks describing 
professionalism, the military will not have any space to override civilian supremacy. 
In this Sri Lankan case study, subjective control over the years unexpectedly 
continued to undermine politicization due to divisions in the political system, 
pushing professionalization of the military, as the officer corps feared loss of jobs. 
Therefore, models offered by Huntington, Alagappa, Bruneau and Matei have to be 
combined because individually they don’t provide a sufficient framework for 
understanding Sri Lankan CMR.  
296 Bruneau, “Impediments to the Accurate Conceptualization of Civil–Military Relations,” 16. 
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V. CONCLUSION  
Historically, Sri Lankan government’s CMR strategy illustrates high levels of 
subjective control, but due to a deeply divided political setting and war, the military has 
experienced gradual professionalization due to increased resources and an officer corps 
that is has tried to stay away from the political divisions. Alagappa’s state coercion and 
Matei’s new conceptualization framework models are applicable in the different time 
periods since post-independence and the post-conflict period, but it is Huntington’s 
model of subjective civilian control that has primary applicability because the civilians 
are more prone to use ethno-nationalistic, socio-political, socio-economic, and 
constitutional authority combined with incentives and service rivalries to subordinate 
military agents.  
After the conflict in 2009, the Sri Lankan military’s growing popularity, 
reputation and confidence were seen as increments of military prerogatives by many 
scholars. In addition, observers also saw the immense challenge for a civilian government 
of a small island state to maintain a 375,000 person military. In other words, it is possible 
that such a large military force might overpower its civilian leaders in the event of a 
serious breach of national security. Also if the government cut military incentives, it 
could overthrow civilian leadership. In the Sri Lankan context, those hypothetical 
scenarios have not emerged. Since Sri Lanka’s independence, the Sri Lankan military has 
never developed any corporate interest among its officer corps. This is attributable to peer 
competition and a divided political system. Therefore, it is very unlikely that in the future 
Sri Lankan military would overrule its civilian supremacy.   
In a post-conflict setting, Sri Lanka proved that it can effectively utilize the 
military in six different roles and missions, which Matei’s framework discusses.297 The 
use of military in nation-building projects was criticized by many who alleged 
militarization of the country. However, in this case, the military’s involvement in 
rehabilitation, reconstruction, and reconciliation projects did not undermine democratic 
                                                 
297 Matei, “A New Conceptualization of Civil Military Relations,” 31. 
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civilian control. Instead, it increased objective control, improving CMR. The military 
became a state tool, not a political one.  
The subjective control approach to counter-insurgency operations against the JVP 
and the LTTE compelled civilians to allow the unintentional development of objective 
control. In addition, dynamics in state coercion and in Bruneau and Matei’s framework 
have also been used to maintain CMR. The subjective control was based on ethno-
nationalistic, socio-political, socio-economic, and constitutional authority in different 
time frames. The civilian leaders used those elements as follows:  
• First, the above mentioned three elements were used to create public
opinion and were subsequently used to politicize the military.
• Second, civilian leaders used constitutional authority as a tool to obtain
this subjective control.
• Third, they used incentives and corruption to gain military subordination.
However, at the end of the conflict, the military had grown professionally and 
developed its own culture, which allowed objective control. 
The Sri Lankan government’s success in eliminating the LTTE in 2009 
contributed to a situation of high objective control in which military autonomy was fully 
established because President Rajapaksa used a hands-off method and allowed military 
commander to decide the military strategy. At the end of the conflict, this military 
autonomy distracted the senior military leadership because General Fonseka failed to 
identify a strong hidden subjective control network developed inside the military, and 
civilian leaders never realized the unintentional effect. The peer competition and service 
rivalry led to increased objective control and professionalization of the military. 
However, for the success of internal conflict, the Sri Lankan case explicitly provides 
evidence that civilian leaders should allow the military autonomy and maintain low 
subjective control officially. However, subjective control under certain conditions can 
also lead to professionalization. Consequently, the conflict illustrates that high state 
coercion model dynamics can elevate the military’s influence in specific regions and 
political arenas, but high levels of institutional mechanisms, reliance on few generals 
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other than the commanders of armed services along with service rivalry can be used 
against any CMR threats.  
Exploitation of subjective control remains a possibility in the civilian sector 
because Sri Lanka’s legislative oversight process is weak, and will continue to be, as long 
as its capacities are limited by the executive power and a lack of political will. Politicians 
are reluctant to become involved in defense policy planning and to criticize the military 
because of its growing popularity due to the end of the war. Therefore, the full spectrum 
of democratic control values will not be inculcated into the Sri Lankan CMR in the 
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